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THE PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVE 
OF THE STUDY 
Economic Performance of the CFA Zone 
The economic performance in Sub-Saharan Africa has been unsatisfactory, and 
this poor performance is not a recent phenomenon. The problem worsened starting from 
the mid-1980s, and most Sub-Saharan African countries were confronted with economic 
crises. These countries resorted to different reform programs in their attempts to counter 
the economic turmoil. The reform programs took a different form in the CF A countries, 
which reflected the rules and objectives of the zone. The latter, comprising fourteen 
countries ( excluding the Comoros Islands), is served by two central Banks: 
1. The "BanqueCentrale des Etats de I' Afrique de l'Ouest" (BCEAO - Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). 
2. The "Banque Centrale des Etats de I' Afrique Centrale (BEAC - Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon). 
Q,<,L 
The common currency of the two central banks, "Communote Financiere 
Africaine" (CFA), has been pegged to the French Franc (FF) at a fixed rate of 50 CFA to 
1 FF since 1948 ( and devalued for the first time in January 1994), and is guaranteed full 
convertibility into French Francs through an operations account at the French Treasury. 
The member central banks are required to keep 65% of their foreign exchange reserves in 
French Francs at the central bank of France, "Banque de France" .1 
The CFA zone is intended to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies of the 
member countries and, thereby, foster and maintain their economic and financial stability. 
Although the zone members did enjoy a relatively sustained economic growth, with a low 
inflation rate comparable to that of the industrial countries, a serious turnaround in the 
economies of the Sub-Saharan African countries in the mid- l 980s undermined the region's 
effort to improve growth. The problem stemmed from an unfavorable external 
environment ~s well as inappropriate domestic policies. On account of external shocks, the 
downturn in the economic activities in industrial countries (especially in the early 1980s) 
resulting in a decline of the export prices of the Sub-Saharan African countries, led to a 
major deterioration in their terms of trade. Equally important, is their lack of international 
competitiveness, due to the appreciation of their domestic currencies. The latter problem 
is even more acute in the case of the CF A countries which, because of the institutional 
arrangements of the zone, left the exchange rate parity unchanged on the fac;e of the 
appreciating French Franc vis-a..,vis the US dollar from the mid-1980s (Figure 1). 
Consequently, the nominal and real effective exchange rates of the zone countries 
appreciated. 
The CF A zone's deteriorating terms of trade and its loss of international 
competitiveness (APPENDIX B) resulted in declining export earnings which reduced the 
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Note: An increase in the exchange rate indicates a depreciation 




governments' revenues, while their already colossal expenditures were deemed difficult· 
(and unpopular) to scale back to accommodate the ongoing economic crisis. Each country 
in the zone experienced an appreciation of its nominal and real effective exchange rates 
and a worsening terms of trade especially from the mid-l 980s. 
Hadjimichael et al. (1995) found that the effects of the CFA countries' worsening terms of 
trade and loss of external competitiveness switched the government saving position from a 
positive saving equivalent to 3.1 percent of GDP in 1986 to a dissaving of 4.7 percent of· 
GDP by 1989. The external and internal imbalances (which led to the economic crisis) 
seriously undermined the economic growth of the CFA zone. Prior to 1985, it recorded 
higher economic growth compared to the non-CF A countries. The trend has abruptly 
reversed since 1985 and the economic performance of the zone lags far behind that of its 
neighbors, as can be seen in Figure 2. 
Given the mounting economic and financial difficulties of the Sub-Saharan African 
countries in general, and the CFA zone in particular, structural adjustment programs,-
aimed at eradicating the impediments to growth and stimulating development, were 
undertaken. The adjustment strategies differed markedly between the CFA and non-CFA 
zones. Apart from other internal adjustments, countries with flexible exchange rates 
responded to their deteriorating terms of trade by depreciating their nominal exchange 
rates, thereby keeping real effective exchange rates close to equilibrium. In contrast, CF A 
countries, due to their exchange rate arrangements, could not use the exchange rate as a 
policy instrument. Consequently, the zone relied entirely on internal adjustments in its 
4 
Figure 2: Real GDP Growth (Annual Percent Change)) 
Year 
Source: World Economic Outlook. 
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attempts to secure a real effective exchange rate depreciation and regain its international 
competitiveness. 
A real depreciation can come about either through a nominal devaluation or 
appropriate change in relative prices (lower domestic prices compared to foreign prices). 
The second alternative was the option chosen by the CFA zone's authorities to address 
their lack of external competitiveness. It consists of financial policies aimed at reducing 
the domestic demand for goods and. services to accommodate the country's income, 
coupled with policies that switch expenditures toward nontradeables. To Devarajan and de 
Melo (1987a), this strategy is effective if properly implemented. They claim that 
participating in the CFA zone does not prevent member countries from adjusting to 
macroeconomic imbalances. According to the authors, there exists, apart from the 
exchange rate, enough instruments, such as a reduction in government expenditures or a 
change in commercial policies, to achieve a real devaluation. 
A demand management policy, to effect a real depreciation, requires enough cut in 
government expenditures and · credits to the private sector if it is to put sufficient 
downward pressure on nontradeable prices. Thus, internal adjustments alone, necessary to 
counteract the terms of trade deterioration and the loss of international competitiveness, 
can be very costly in terms of output and employment. This is exemplified by the case of 
the contractionary policy adopted by the CF A zone countries to correct both the terms of 
trade deterioration and the CFA Franc appreciation. According to the World Bank, 
between 1980-90, most currencies of Anglophone Africa depreciated in real terms by at 
least 77 percent while the CFA Franc appreciated by some 30 percent 2, (Figure 3). 
6 
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Source: Adapted from Bouton et al. (1994) 
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Given the sizes of the external and internal imbalances due to both terms of trade 
deterioration and CFA appreciation, internal adjustments alone would be incapable of 
restoring equilibrium, and would instead be associated with negative growth and high 
unemployment, as the monetary and fiscal policies become too restrictive and deflationary. 
As Hussain ( 1994) put it, "If the main cause of the decline is external 
shocks, then adjustment policies cannot be an effective answer to the problem. But if 
domestic policy weaknesses are the main culprit, then altering these policies should make a 
difference". Th~s, the policies resorted to by the CF A zone countries to address their 
pressing reform needs turned out to be ineffective (as well as too costly and unpopular). 
In their study on macroeconomic reforms and growth in Africa, Bouton et al. 
' 
( 1994) classified African countries according to their fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate 
policy stance. The study classified almost all of the CFA countries in the "poor" to "very 
poor" fiscal policy stance for the periods 1990-91 and 1991-92. The same result holds 
true for the exchange rate policy stance. Only for the monetary policy stance are all the 
CFA countries rated "good" (or adequate) to "fair" for the same periods. 
The CFA countries, however, managed to keep inflation at an exceptionally low 
rate and below that of the industrial countries from mid- l 980s, contrary to the non-CF A 
countries (Figure 4). Nevertheless, this low inflation rate was insufficient to compensate 
for the CF A appreciation and the deterioration of the terms of trade as the internal and 
external financial conditions of these countries continued to worsen. 
With the internal adjustments alone seen as a failure, and the growing external and 
internal imbalances, an alternative strategy was required to · effectively restore the 
8 
Figure 4: Inflation (Annual Percent Change) 
-+- CFA Countries 
--Non-CFA African Countries 
_.._ Industrial Countries 
Year 
Source: World Economic Outlook. 
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competitiveness of the zone members, The substantial nominal devaluation (50 percent in 
terms of foreign currencies) in January 1994 came as a response to the pressing need. The 
question, however, arises as to whether this constitutes the end of the zone countries' 
problems. This question is difficult to answer beforehand given the controversies 
surrounding the effects of nominal devaluation on macroeconomic variables. Nashashibi 
(1983) nevertheless contends that " Devaluation is not painless; it is often better than the 
alternatives and it may _be the only way to reduce distortions and restore profitability to 
exports". 
Objective of the Study 
Since the mid- l 980s, there was almost a unanimous view that the CF A Franc was 
overvalued and that a nominal devaluation was required to regain the zone's external 
competitiveness, and thereby revive it.s economies. As a consequence of the overvaluation, 
the zone's imports were made artificially cheaper for domestic consumers and exports 
dearer for foreign importers. The loss of international competitiveness that resulted was 
believed to have had profound adverse effects on the economic performance of the region. 
Dornbusch and Helmers (1988) highlighted the main consequences of a currency 
misalignment ( overvaluation) as summarized below, 
I. a loss in external competitiveness, 
2. loss of domestic production, employment, and fiscal revenues, 
3. an ultimate devaluation, 
IO 
4. adverse effects on domestic financial markets. 
The loss of international competitiveness is paramount in that it can be thought of 
as the source of the other problems of a currency overvaluation. External competitiveness 
is thus a very important parameter for a country's economic performance. Cottani et al. 
(1990) asserted that exchange rate stability and correct exchange rate alignment are 
crucial conditions to improve economic performance in developing countries, as evidenced 
by the case of some Latin American, Asian, and African countries. Edwards (1989b) in his · 
test of the relationship between real exchange rate misalignment and economic 
performance, concluded that persistent misalignment is associated with poor economic 
performance. Ghura and Grennes ( 1993) using pooled time-series and cross-section data 
for 33 Sub-Saharan African countries, and, based on different measures of real exchange 
rate misalignment, also confirmed the negative relationship between real exchange rate 
misalignment and economic performance ( economic growth, imports, exports, saving, and 
investment). 
Drawing on these studies (and many others), and given the poor economic 
performance experienced by the CFA zone countri~s, international competitiveness (as 
measured by real effective exchange rate) can be viewed as a key factor for the economic 
recovery of the zone. The attempt by the responsible authorities to achieve the goal of 
economic recovery through contractionary (deflationary) policies was proven too costly 
and ineffective. Khan and Night ( 1982) posit that "Programs designed to achieve quick 
results on the balance of payments via sharp deflation are likely to have significant and 
undesirable effects on output, employment, and factor incomes, particularly in the short 
run." 
11 
To quickly and effectively restore international competitiveness and 
macroeconomic equilibrium, a nominal devaluation (an expenditure-switching and 
expenditure-reducing policy) was required. The policy works, other than reducing 
domestic demand, to switch demand toward domestic goods (nontradeables) through its 
upward effects on the relative price of tradeables. The real exchange rate, defined as the 
domestic relative price of tradeable, PT/PN (Dornbusch and Helmers, 1988) will thereby 
depreciate and the devaluing country's international competitiveness improved (Rivera and· 
Rivera, 1985). The real exchange rate, as defined above, is a good indicator of the degree 
of profitability of the tradeable sector. Under plausible conditions, its increase (real 
depreciation) will be associated with a reallocation of _resources from nontradeable to 
tradeable sectors, thereby, increasing the supply and reducing the domestic demand of the 
latter3. It is argued that the gain in competitiveness (real depreciation of the exchange rate) 
brought about by a nominal devaluation can be reinforced through contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policies designed to contain domestic inflation, without which the gain 
in competitiveness can be rapidly eroded. This implicitly indicates that a nominal 
devaluation may not bring about a permanent real depreciation of the real exchange rate, 
as domestic inflation will catch up and eradicate the competitiveness gain. 
This gloomy effect of a devaluation on domestic relative price (real exchange rate) 
is even more disturbing when one considers (or adopts) the view of the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) doctrine. According to the PPP view, which expresses the real exchange rate 
as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for changes in domestic and foreign prices (EP*/P), 
a deviation of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium level (assumed to be a constant) · 
is a temporary phenomenon which ought to be reversed. Accordingly, a devaluation 
12 
(assuming initial external balance) forces the actual real exchange rate away from its 
equilibrium PPP level, making the domestic economy more competitive. The current 
account surplus that results will hinder the international competitiveness. Moreover, 
domestic prices ( costs and wages) will be revised and increased to the same proportion as 
the devaluation, thereby leaving the real exchange rate unchanged. This approach is, 
however, highly criticized, especially for considering the equilibrium real exchange rate as 
a constant to which any deviation must return. Harberger (1986), Khan (1986), Khan and 
Montiel ( 1987), and Edwards ( 1989a) consider the equilibrium real exchange rate not as a 
constant, but as an endogenous variable which responds to · its "fundamental" 
determinants. Other criticisms assert that the PPP holds only in the long run but not in the 
short run. 
On all accounts, the effects of a devaluation are not clear-cut. Instead, they are 
fraught with controversies which make it difficult to predict beforehand the future trend of 
the economic variables following a nominal devaluation. 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the effects of a nominal 
devaluation on the external competitiveness of the CFA zone economies. In other words, 
an inquiry will be made as to whether a nominal devaluation will lead to a permanent ( or 
relatively so) real depreciation of the CFA Franc, and whether the zone's exports and 
imports will respond to the real devaluation, if any. 
Critics argue that devaluation may prove counterproductive, and the inflation and 
social malaise which come with it, make a devaluation an undesirable alternative approach 
to solve the economic and financial problems of developing countries. In fact, inflation 
following a devaluation, is one of the threats that can seriously undermine the adjustment 
13 
efforts and may even force the devaluing country to another de;valuation, thus plugging the 
country into an "inflation-cum-devaluation" spiral. 
The study will, therefore, also investigate the inflation and output effects of a 
nominal devaluation of the CFA Franc. The research intends to shed light on what can be 
expected from a nominal devaluation in developing countries in general, and in the CF A 
countries in particular. 
1. See R. J. Bathia (1985) and APPENDIX A for more details. 
2. Cited from Sonko (1994). 
3. Some of these conditions are a positive supply elasticity of tradeables with respect to 
their relative prices, PT/PN, with a corresponding negative demand elasticity; and assuming that the 
Marshal-Lener condition holds. Other conditions include less than full employment of resources prior to 
devaluation, easy mobility ofresources between sectors, and the change in domestic relative price must be 




The Relative Performance of the CFA Zone, and Theories of Devaluation 
The CFA zone countries are subject to a tradeoff between stability (as can be . . 
conferred by the fixed parity and the built-in monetary and fiscal discipline of the zone) 
and flexibility (through the ability to use the exchange rate as a policy instrument). This 
dilemma whic~ can be thought off as a tradeoff between inflation and output (Philips 
curve) has taken a proportionally increasing importance in academic and policy debates 
due to the sharp reversal of the zone's economy (from mid-1980s) and the view that the 
overvalued common currency has been hampering the full structural adjustment required 
for economic recovery. 
On the question as to whether or not participating in the zone hurts the members 
( or if the latter' s economic performance compares poorly relative to other developing 
countries), a number of empirical research studies emerged to supplement the theoretical 
discussions. Devarajan and de Melo ( 1987b) tested the economic performance of the CF A 
countries as compared to selected "comparators" (63 developing countries) during the 
period 1960-82. Using a variance component statistical model, the authors reported that if 
the CFA countries are treated as a single country, they performed better vis-a-vis their 
comparators than when considered individually. The results, the authors claim, are even 
15 
brighter for the CF A countries for the period 1973-82. Guillaumont et al. ( 1988) reached 
the same conclusion when they found that the zone's growth performance is close to the 
average performance of other developing countries and even better than that of other 
African countries for the period 1960-81. 
Elbadawi and Majd (1992), in their empirical study on fixed parity and short- and 
long-run economic performance in the CFA zone, reached a more cautious conclusion. 
Their results pointed out an erosion of the external competitiveness of the CF A zone with 
regard to other comparators in the short run. Using a modified-control-group approach, 
and taking into account initial conditions, internal and external shocks, and policy stance, 
the authors found that over the short run the zone was outperformed by the group of 
comparators in terms of output growth, exports, investment, and saving ( except for 
inflation). In the long run, however, the results are in favor of the CFA zone. 
Other studies came up with a clear-cut negative view of the zone, and related its · 
poor performance to the stringent rules of the Union. Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) 
highlighted the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime on the face of highly 
variable external terms of trade. Their analysis of the costs and benefits of the CF A 
membership resulted in the conclusion that "fixed exchange rates have been, on the whole, 
a bad bargain for the CF A member countries. For most of the CF A members, the inflation 
benefits do not appear to have been large enough to offset the costs on the output side. 
Under 'reasonable' output-inflation tradeoffs, these countries would have been better off 
having the flexibility to adjust to external shocks". 
In another study, Devarajan and de Melo ( 1990) reassessed their 1987 work which 
helped them reconsider their earlier conclusion. They asserted that, as a consequence of a 
16 
failure to fully adjust their economy (including nominal devaluation) in light of changes in 
the world environment and persistent current account deficits, the zone members' GDP 
growth rates fell behind those of their counterparts. Allechi and Niamkey (1994) in a 
rather different approach performed a cost-benefit analysis of participating in the CF A 
zone. Using the theory of reserves pooling, they found that although there are gains from 
the reserves pooling, when the opportunity costs of maintaining the operations account are 
taken into account, there are more losers than gainers in the zone with the 65 percent 
reserves pooling system. 
The available theoretical and empirical literature seem to go along the line 
indicated by Corden (1990). According to the latter, there are two approaches to 
exchange rate policy in developing countries: the "real targets" and the "nominal anchor" 
approaches. For the real target school, the nominal exchange rate should be viewed as a 
policy instrument (together with other policies) to affect real variables in the economy, 
such as the real exchange rate. The approach implies that because of rigidities (wages for 
instance) in the economy, nominal devaluation should be resorted to (in, say, periods of 
loss of international competitiveness), and is capable of generating long-lasting real 
effects. This is the view adopted by the opponents of the fixed parity system. To them, 
fixed parity can have severe consequences (through misalignment) in terms of lack of 
external competitiveness and a consequent decline in economic growth. This view is 
supported by studies by Cottani et al. (1990), Edwards (1989b, 1989c ), and Ghura and 
Grennes (1993). 
According to the nominal anchor view, nominal devaluation only leads to nominal 
effects with no (or little) real changes. Nominal devaluation is thus considered as not only 
17 
ineffective, but also as a threat to the economy due to the high inflation it imposes · 
(Devarajan and Rodrik, 1991; Elbadawi and Majd, 1992). Adherents of this view (in other 
words, proponents of fixed parity) claim that a fixed exchange rate regime can accelerate 
economic growth through safe investment environment and the monetary and fiscal 
discipline conferred by the zone. Devarajan and de Melo ( 1987 a)· headed in that direction 
when they claimed that the CF A zone members have enough instruments at their disposal 
to. effect real depreciation necessary to correct their internal and external imbalances. Their · 
inability to achieve that, the authors believe, is simply explained by the fact that these 
available instruments (such as a reduction in government spending or a change in 
commercial policies) are not always used by the member countries, ·or are used in the 
wrong direction. 
The theoretical and empirical literature on currency devaluation can also be 
arranged in three mainstream views: the elasticity, absorption, and monetary approaches. 
For the elasticity approach (which can be traced back to Bikerdike), nominal devaluation. 
is a means to regain a country's external competitiveness through its direct effect on the 
real exchange rate .. It embeds the view that (ass1,1ming a small country case where 
tradeable prices are determined in the world market), a nominal de.valuation will result in 
an equiproportional real exchange rate depreciation, thus rendering goods in the 
exportable market more profitable for domestic producers (or cheaper, in other words, 
for foreigners), while imports are made more expensive for domestic consumers. The 
increase in relative tradeable prices frees up resources in the nontradeable sector for use in 
the tradeable ·sector whose activities flourish. The consequent increase in exports, and the 
decrease in imports (due"to higher imports price), occasion a trade surplus (or reduce the 
18 
existing trade deficit), and boosts domestic employment. The approach however identifies 
conditions under which a nominal devaluation can induce a trade surplus ( or a reduction in 
trade deficit). In fact, a devaluation reduces the unit price of exports (in foreign currency), 
while it increases the unit price of imports (in domestic currency). For the trade balance 
to improve following a devaluation, the increase in export volume, on one hand, and the 
decrease in import volume on the other hand, need to be sufficient to offset the changes in · 
the unit prices. This is the famous Marshall-Lerner condition (or stability condition) which 
states that, for a devaluation to have a positive effect on trade balance, the sum of the 
elasticities of the domestic demand for imports ( l; ) and of the foreign demand for imports 
( l;*) must exceed one (in absolute values), 
I ~ I + I ~ * I >' 1. 
The major criticism of the elasticities approach, however, is its analysis based on a partial 
equilibrium framework which prevents relative price change following a devaluation. 
The second theory of devaluation, the absorption approach, stresses the 
relationship between domestic income and expenditures (absorption). According to the 
approach, for a· devaluation to affect the trade balance, it must have the . expenditure-
switching and expenditure-reducing effects. The relative price change brought about by a 
devaluation can persist only if domestic demand is cut back in order to keep nontradeable 
prices from increasing due to the induced high demand in the nontradeable sector. 
Viewed from another angle, an improvement in the trade balance can occur only if 
domestic expenditure is increasing at a rate less than that of the national income. This 
proposition is explicit in the following identity, 
19 
Y - (C + I + G) = X - M or Y - A = X - M 
where, Y = real income 
C = consumption 
I = investment 
G = government consumption 
X = exports 
M = imports 
A= C +I+ G (or absorption) 
Assuming that income is constant, a reduction in absorption (A) must take place for the 
trade balance (X - M) to improve regardless of the elasticities (Cooper, 1971 ). 
The third theory, the monetary approach, contrary to the elasticities approach, 
takes into account the interactions between the external sector and the monetary side of 
the economy. It posits that a devaluation reduces the real balances of the economy due to 
the higher prices it entails. Assuming that the responsible authorities keep the nominal 
money balances unchanged, households and businesses will reduce their expenditures 
(absorption) in the face of the dwindling real balances in order to restore the "equilibrium" 
value of their real money and other financial assets. The trade balance will respond 
favorably. The assumption of full employment condition and purchasing power parity 
(flexible prices) embedded in the monetary approach, however, prevents domestic prices 
from going astray from a level consistent with foreign prices. The positive balance of 
payments following the temporary relative price change increases domestic real balances 
(wealth) until the initial equilibrium is fully restored. At the new equilibrium, the real 
exchange rate and the balance of payments return to their pre-devaluation levels. 
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It can be deduced from these three mainstream apprnaches that a devaluation is 
expected to increase the relative price of tradeables that may later be translated into an 
improved trade balance position and higher domestic output. 
Certain_ conditions, however, might prevent the nominal devaluation from 
permanently altering the real exchange rate. On the production side, the higher relative 
price for tradeables undermines production in the nontradeable sector, thus lowering its 
output. On the demand side, the substitution effect of a devaluation (coupled with the 
trade surplus) increases the demand for nontradeables. The combined effects (lower 
production and higher demand) result in an upward pressure on nontradeable prices 
which, if left alone to pursue its normal course, can revert the initial real depreciation 
immediately following a nominal devaluation. This situation is reinforced if wages are 
indexed and if intermediate goods constitute an important part of the devaluing country's 
imports. 
It is clear why much attention has been devoted in theoretical and empirical 
literature to the real exchange rate, as its change following a devaluation, while uncertain, 
constitutes a precondition for any improv~ment in the external and internal imbalances of 
an economy. 
Measures and Determi~ants of Real Exchange Rate 
The real exchange rate, a measure of a country's international competitiveness, can 
be defined in different ways in the literature, but in all, what is sought is to find an 
indicator which explains more accurately movements in the trade balance (Dornbusch and 
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Helmers, 1988). One of these measures defines the real exchange rate as the relative price 
of tradeables to nontradeables (Edwards, 1989a; Marsh and Tockarick, 1994), 
RERT,NT = EPTIPNT 
where, RERT,NT = real exchange rate 
E = nominal exchange rate ( defined as home currency price of foreign 
currency) 
PT = price of tradeables (in foreign currency) 
PN_T = price of (domestic) nontradeables (in domestic currency) 
The above measure can simply be written as RERT.NT = PTIPNT, with PT redefined as 
tradeable price in domestic currency. 
The computation of this indicator requires the knowledge of what constitutes 
tradeables, in order to determine their prices (PT and PNT). Another problem with this 
measure, as pointed out by Edwards ( 1989a), is its inapplicability in empirical works, as 
proxies need to be found for the prices of tradeables and nontradeables. The advantage, 
however, is that its increase (real depreciation) signals the profitability in the· tradeable 
sector as compared to that of the nontradeables. 
A real exchange rate based on the consumer price indexes (CPI) is also frequently 
used in practice. It is defined as, 
RERcP1 = E(P*/P) 
where, E = nominal exchange rate (defined as home currency price of foreign currency) 
P = domestic price level 
p* = foreign price level 
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Despite its wide use, the measure of competitiveness based on CPI is subject to criticisms 
as the CPI can be influenced by price controls and other distortions. Also because the CPI 
includes both tradeable and nontradeable prices, a change in the real exchange rate can not 
tell much about the relative profitability of activities in the tradeable sector (Marsh and 
Tokarick, 1994; Lipschitz and McDonald, 1991). 
International competitiveness can also be measured through a comparison of unit 
labor costs (ULC) in the tradeable sector in different countries. 
RERuLc = E(ULC* /ULC) 
where, ULC = unit labor cost in the domestic tradeable sector 
ULC* = unit labor cost in the foreign tradeable sector 
In the context of developing countries, data on unit labor costs are rare (if not 
nonexistent). To the extent that they exist, real exchange rate based on unit labor costs 
should be interpreted with caution as its movements can be due to changes in other input 
costs used in production (Lipschitz and McDonald, 1991) or a substitution of capital for 
labor. 
Other measures of international competitiveness include real exchange rate based 
on export unit values, and the profitability of producing traded goods (Marsh and 
Tokarick, 1994). 
These different variants of the measure of external competitiveness have, each, 
advantages and drawbacks, and thereby, should be viewed as complementary rather than 
substitutes. 
Movements in the real exchange rate are documented by various scholars to 
determine the responses of the actual and equilibrium real exchange rates to monetary and 
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real disturbances. In this respect, a distinction is made between actual and equilibrium real 
exchange rates. Following Edwards (1989a), " The equilibrium real exchange rate is that 
relative price of tradeables to nontradeables that, for given sustainable ( equilibrium) values 
of other relevant variables - such as taxes, international prices, and technology - results in 
the simultaneous attainment of internal and external equilibrium". This definition differs 
from that of the purchasing power parity (PPP) approach which considers the equilibrium 
real exchange rate (a fixed number) as the one in the year in which the economy is thought 
to be in equilibrium. The main objection to the PPP definition is that it fails to recognize 
that the equilibrium real exchange rate is itself an endogenous variable subject to changes 
whenever its determinants - the "fundamentals" - are altered (Edwards, 1989a, 1994; 
Elbadawi, 1994; Coughlin and Koedijk, 1990). Although the PPP approach still has its 
appeal, evidence shows that the equilibrium real exchange rate follows movements in real 
variables considered as its determinants, thus denying the validity of the PPP approach. 
Economists seem to agree on the invalidity of the PPP approach in the short run, yet need 
to reach a consensus on its soundness in the long run. 
Various studies reveal that the long-run (equilibrium) real exchange rate is 
determined by real variables - "fundamentals" - only, while the short-run (actual) rate is 
affected by nominal as well as real variables. Khan and Ostry (1991), based on a version of 
the dependent-economy model, linked the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) to 
(mainly) terms of trade movements and commercial policy changes. Edwards ( 1989a, 
1989b ), and Elbadawi ( 1994) also identified, in empirical works, the fundamental 
determinants of ERER. Although they acknowledge that the ERER is an endogenous 
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variable, Coughlin and Koedijk ( 1990), contrary to other studies, reported that little is· 
known about its determinants. 
In studying the behavior of actual real exchange rates, Edwards (1989a, 1994), 
Ghura and Grennes ( 1993) identified its real and nominal determinants. Of importance, 
they found that the nominal devaluation variable is always significantly positive, an 
indication that a nominal devaluation is a powerful device for reestablishing the external 
competitiveness of developing countries. One caveat for these studies is that they · 
investigate only the contemporaneous effects of a nominal devaluation. 
Long-run effects of nominal devaluation on external competitiveness were 
examined by Rouis et al. (1994) for Sub-Saharan Africa. Their empirical results show that 
there exists a long-run effect of nominal devaluation on the real exchange rate. The 
limitation of the model, however, is that it ignores the effects of real variables. A 
comprehensive model needs to include both real and nominal variables as well as 
devaluation lags as explanatory variables for an effective estimation of the relationship 
between nominal devaluation and real exchange rate, which this study is intended to do. 
The issue of devaluation and its impact on ~xtemal competitiveness entail other 
problems that need to be accounted for, namely, export and import growth, inflation, and 
output growth. A major concern of researchers over the past several years has been the 
relative price responsiveness of exports and imports (Marshall-Lerner condition). Khan 
(1974) in estimating the export and import demand functions for 15 developing countries, 
found that prices do play an important role in the determination of the developing 
countries' imports and exports. Similar results were found for African countries for their 
exports and imports (Bonds, 1983; Jaeger, 1991; Ghura and Grennes, 1994). These 
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studies confirm that the Marshall-Lerner condition for successful devaluation is satisfied 
for the Sub-Saharan African countries. Tegene ( 1989) criticized most of the above studies 
for failing to incorporate the effective exchange rate in their trade flow models. His 
results, however, confirm the conclusion reached by others. Moreover, his findings 
suggest that exchange rates have, in general, adverse effects in the short run, while they 
improve the trade balance in the long run. 
An opposite view ( elasticity pessimism) charges that Sub-Saharan African · 
countries' exports (mainly agricultural products) and imports (with intermediate goods 
accounting for a higher proportion) are inelastic with respect to changes in relative prices. 
If so, a devaluation will be ineffective in inducing a tr'1:de balance surplus, even if it is 
successful in generation a real exchange rate depreciation (Hadjimichael et al., 1995). 
Another problem tackled in different empirical studies in conjunction with 
devaluation is the inflation the latter imposes. Inflation pressure, following a devaluation, 
is not a hidden truth. By increasing the prices of imported goods, a devaluation leads to 
domestic inflation which, if not contained can not only revert the initial real depreciation, 
but also undermine the economic growth of the country. Evidence on non-CFA African 
countries confirm that view. 
The effect of devaluation on real output, on the other hand, was documented by 
several authors, and the empirical results remain mixed. The discussion basically goes as 
follows. A devaluation affects both the supply and demand sides of the economy. On the 
demand side, a devaluation shifts domestic aggregate demand through substitution and 
income effects. On the supply side, a devaluation by increasing the price of imports 
(especially intermediate goods) shifts up the production cost of domestically produced 
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goods, thereby reducing output. The ultimate effect of a devaluation on domestic output 
depends on how changes in aggregate demand compare to those in aggregate supply 
(Krugman and Taylor, 1978; Gylfason and Schmid, 1983; van Wijnbergen, 1986). 
The increasing pessimism of the effect of a devaluation on output in developing 
countries is essentially due to the complete dependence of these countries on the imports 
of intermediate goods, and the latter's non-substitutability with domestic products (Bruno, 
1979). Using different methods of analysis (control group, econometric approach, macro-
simulation, macromodel, etc.), Cooper (1971), Edwards (1986, 1989a, 1989b), Khan 
( 1990), Edwards and Santella ( 1992), reached different conclusions of the effect of 
devaluation on output. Further empirical work, like the one under study is necessary in 
order to shed more light on the effect of a devaluation on the real exchange rate, exports 




REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE 
Inappropriate exchange rate and macroeconomic policies in Sub-Saharan African 
countries that led to substantial exchange rate misalignment are at the core of the poor 
economic performance in the region. The negative relationship between poor real 
exchange rate policy and economic performance is an indication that real exchange rate is 
a key relative price in an economy, and that policies to keep the exchange rate close to its 
equilibrium value are indispensable for economic recovery. It is for that reason that a good 
number of developing countries in general, and Sub-Saharan African countries in 
particular, resorted to large and discrete nominal devaluations of their currencies in order 
to correct overvaluation, thereby improving their international competitiveness through 
real depreciation. Knowledge of all the determinants of the real exchange rate, both in the 
short and long run, and their relative weights can help achieve that goal. 
Studies that addressed the issue include Cottani et al. (1990), Dornbusch (1985), 
Edwards (1989a, 1989b, 1994), Elbadawi (1994), Ghura and Grennes (1993), Harberger 
(1986), Khan 1986), Khan and Montiel (1987), Khan and Ostry (1991), and Snape 
( 1988). 
Contrary to the purchasing power parity theorists, these authors posit that the 
equilibrium real exchange rate is not an "immutable number", but responds to changes in 
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different variables known as its "fundamentals". The equilibrium (long-run) real exchange 
rate is thus sensitive to a wide range of variables among which some are 
believed to have more influence. These include the international terms of trade, capital 
flows, trade policies, exchange and capital controls, world market real interest rates, and 
the level and composition of government consumption (Cottani et al. (1990), Edwards 
(1989a, 1989b, 1994), Elbadawi (1994), Khan and Ostry (1991) among others). These 
real variables affect the long-run (equilibrium) real exchange rate, while in the short run, 
both real and i:iominal variables determine the actual real exchange rate. The theoretical 
foundation of the effects of some of these variables on the real exchange rate follows. 
Determinants of Equilibrium and Actual Real Exchange Rates 
International terms of trade: 
Exogenous changes in the external terms of trade (defined as the ratio of unit price 
of exports to that of imports) affect the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate. The 
theoretical literature points at an ambiguous effect depending on the sizes of the 
substitution and income effects. 
A deterioration of the terms of trade (say, a permanent decline in the price of 
exports) leads to a substitution effect on both the supply and demand sides. On the 
production side, resources are reallocated from the export sector to import substitute and 
nontradeable sectors. Tradeable output will decline in favor of nontradeables. On the 
demand side, the lower export price will reduce the price of tradeables relative to that of 
nontradeables, forcing consumers to adjust their consumption pattern by consuming 
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relatively more tradeables. The income effect following the decline in export prices, on the 
other hand, reduces the real national income, thereby cutting down demand in both 
tradeable and nontradeable markets. 
Thus, in the tradeable market, the worsening terms of trade leads to a reduction in 
output and an ambiguous effect on demand (increase due to substitution and decrease due 
to income effects), such that the ultimate effect of a decline in export price on the price of 
tradeables remains unclear (Table I). However, if the substitution (in demand) effect 
dominates the income effect, a rise. in the relative price of tradeables, thus a depreciation, 
will occur. 
The change in the equilibrium relative price can be more exactly explained in the 
nontradeable market. Contrary to the tradeable market where excess demand/supply is 
translated into trade deficit/surplus (because of the exchange rate regime), in the 
nontradeable market, excess demand/surplus is eliminated through price adjustment . 
Thus, the rise in output (substitution effect) and fall in demand (both substitution and 
income effects) of nontradeables following the decline in export price, require a lower 
relative price ( depreciation) of nontradeables for their market to clear (Table I). . 
A similar analysis can be carried out when the terms of trade deterioration is due to 
a nse in the import prices. Using the nontradeable market, the analysis indicates a 
reduction (substitution effect) in the supply and a change (increase due to substitution 
effect and decrease due to income effect) in demand for nontradeables, thus, leading to an 
ambiguous effect on tradeable prices. Analysis of the tradeable market, on the other hand, 
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Table 1: Decrease in Export Prices 
Tradeables N ontradeables 
Supply Demand Price Supply Demand Price 
Substitution Effect - + + -
Income Effect - -
Total Effect - ? ? + - Depreciation 
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Table 2: Increase in Import Prices 
Tradeables N ontradeables 
Supply Demand Price Supply Demand Price 
Substitution Effect + - - + 
Income Effect - -
Total Effect + - Appreciation - ? ? 
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following an increase in import prices, show an increase in supply and a decrease in 
demand for tradeables, thus, an unambiguous decrease of tradeable prices (real 
appreciation), Table 2. 
In general, the effect of a tenns of trade shock on the equilibrium real exchange 
rate depends on the (production and demand) substitution and income effects. In the case 
of a decline in export prices, a real depreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate will 
occur (if the substitution effect dominates the income effect), while a real appreciation· 
would result in the case of a rise in the import prices. 
Productivity change: 
An improvement in productivity results in inore efficient production in the sector 
where the change occurs. An increase in productivity in both tradeable and nontradeable 
sectors may affect the equilibrium real exchange rate depending on the income elasticities 
of demand. Of more interest is an improvement in productivity in the tradeable sector 
relative to the nontradeables. A relative technological improvement in the tradeable sector 
has long been viewed as one of the causes of improvements in equilibrium real exchange 
rate (Balassa, 1964 ). ·countries with faster growth of productivity in the tradeable sector 
will face a real appreciation of their currencies (the example of Japan is illustrative). 
The reasoning goes as follows (and is presented in Figure 5). A productivity 
improvement in the tradeable sector relative to the nontradeables results in a higher 
tradeable output. The production possibility frontier of the country shifts outward (from 
AA to BA in Figure 5). Assuming that consumers' taste and preferences between 
tradeables and nontradeables remain unchanged, the new long-run equilibrium is reached 
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at a lower relative price of tradeables ( or a real appreciation) as shown by PNT, compared 
to PNT, where PNT represents the relative price of nontradeables. 
Productivity improvement in the nontradeable sector, on the other hand, will result 
in a real depreciation of the country's exchange rate, a flatter PNT, as compared to PNT in 
Figure 6. Thus, the real exchange rate can appreciate or depreciate following a 
productivity improvement, depending on the sector in which it take place. 
Capital flows: 
Capital flows are another determinant of real exchange rates. A capital inflow will 
cause expenditures on tradeables and nontradeables to increase. This is because (given a 
fixed exchange rate regime), an inflow of capital is associated with a monetary expansion 
which increases domestic demand. Contrary to the tradeable market where nominal prices 
are fixed (because determined in the world market), there will be an increase in the prices 
of nontradeables (real appreciation) following the excess demand that disturbed the initial 
equilibrium. 
In the case of a floating exchange rate regime, a capital inflow increases the foreign 
currency supply and, thus, appreciates the domestic nominal currency, and thereby its real 
rate. Similarly, a capital outflow depreciates the real exchange rate. 
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Trade restrictions (import tariffs, quotas, and non-tariff restrictions) increase the 
price of imports relative to that of nontradeables (and other tradeables). As a result of the 
higher import prices, resources will be shifted to the import substitution (protected) 
sector, as activities in that sector become more lucrative. Consumption, however, will be 
shifted away from it. The excess demand of nontradeables that follows requires price 
adjustment (an appreciation) for the market to clear. 
Viewed differently, imposition of tariffs and quotas reduces imports ( as their prices 
rise) while leaving exports unchanged. A real appreciation of the exchange rate is thus 
required to eradicate the trade surplus that resulted. 
According to Ghura and Grennes (1993), 
The variable CLOSE [Trade Restrictions in our case] is used as 
a proxy for policies affecting trade in general. It can be expected 
that in periods where trade restrictions are tightened by imports 
tariffs, quotas, and exchange controls, the economy becomes less 
open to international trade. The impact of trade restrictions is to 
reduce openness and exert downward pressure on the price of 
tradables versus nontradables (i.e., equilibrium RER appreciation). 
As mentioned earlier, the short-run movements of the real exchange rate is caused 
by both real and nominal variable disturbances. It is generally argued ( contrary to the PPP 
theory) that the real exchange rate can deviate from its long-run equilibrium level, and that 
the misalignment may last for a considerable period of time. These short-run movements 
are generally due to inappropriate macroeconomic policies (fiscal and monetary 
expansions) inconsistent with the domestic gross national product and money supply. As 
indicated by Edwards ( 1989a), "A fundamental principle of open macroeconomics is that 
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in order to have a sustainable macroeconomic equilibrium, it is necessary that monetary 
and fiscal policies be consistent with the chosen nominal exchange rate regime". The 
short-run determinants of real exchange rates include monetary and fiscal policies and 
nominal devaluation and reevaluation. 
Monetary Policy 
An increase in the money supply creates excess supply as the level of desired real 
money balances falls short of the available real balances. Market participants (including 
households and businesses) respond to the disequilibrium by adjusting their portfolios 
through higher demand of tradeables and nontradeables. Given a small country model and 
a fixed exchange rate regime, the excess demand in the nontradeable market causes higher 
prices, while the prices of importables and exportables in the tradeable market remain 
unchanged. The price differential in the two markets induces a reduction in nontradeable 
good consumption, while its production becomes more profitable. This end-result is an 
indication that the actual real exchange rate has appreciated. As Mussa ( 1986) put it, 
"with a pegged exchange rate, the real exchange rate is not independent of the policy-
determined level of the money supply ... ". 
Another way to view this is by relating domestic inflation to monetary growth. 
Higher domestic inflation (as compared to foreign) following monetary growth, increases 
the cost of producing goods at home, which is another way of expressing a lack of 
international competitiveness ( or real appreciation). In fact, the substantially higher 
inflation and consequent real currency appreciation in non-CF A African countries has been 
strongly associated with money growth in these countries. 
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Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal expansion, especially in developing countries where the government sector 
represents an important part of the economy, is another source of real appreciation of 
domestic currencies. Fiscal deficit financed by money creation, just like the monetary 
expansion phenomenon described above, increases the relative price of nontradeables, 
thereby appreciating the real exchange rate. The only difference with the monetary 
expansion is that fiscal expansion financed by money creation leads to more consumption 
on nontradeables (thus more appreciation) as the composition of government expenditures 
includes a higher proportion of nontradeables as compared to tradeables (Harberger, 
1986; Rodriguez, 1980). This implies that the level and composition of government 
expenditures are factors that affect real exchange rate. On this ground, even a fiscal deficit 
financed by borrowing from the private sector (and because the latter will be crowded out) 
will induce a real appreciation. This is similar to the Mundell-Fleming model which. 
predicts a real appreciation of the domestic currency following a fiscal expansion with no 
change in monetary policy (although the latter model _applies to the flexible exchange rate 
in a high capital mobility world). 
Nominal devaluation 
The real exchange rate is affected whenever a given policy alters the ratio of 
tradeable prices (in foreign currency) to nontradeable prices (in domestic currency) ), 
PTIPNT, or the nominal exchange rate, E. A nominal devaluation by making tradeable 
goods more expensive at home, leads to a real depreciation, at least in the very short run. 
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Tradeables become relatively more expensive domestically (real depreciation), while the 
nontradeable prices are unaffected by the exchange rate change (because they are 
determined by the domestic supply and demand conditions). 
The main question is whether the incipient real depreciation will be preserved. This 
may not be the case as the nominal devaluation by discouraging the production of 
nontradeables while encouraging their consumption sets in an upward pressure on their 
prices which may (unless contained by appropriate macroeconomic policies) reverse the 
initial real depreciation. 
The Real Exchange Rate Equation 
Before formulating the real exchange rate equation, some light also needs to be 
shed on exactly what we mean by real exchange rate. The real exchange rate used so far 
should be understood as representing the real effective (or multilateral) exchange rate (as 
opposed to bilateral real exchange rate). We define the real effective exchange rate as 
follows, 
(1) 
where, REERj = real effective exchange rate of country j (CFA country in our case) 
Ei · = nominal bilateral exchange rate between country i and country j ( or CF A 
Franc price of currency i) 
Wi = weight corresponding to trading partner i 
Pi· = price level of trading partner i 
Pj = price level of the home (CF A) country 
t = time 
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With the background on the theoretically sound determinants of the real exchange 
rate, and following Edwards (1989a, 1994), the dynamic equation of the real effective 
exchange rate takes the form, 
Lilog(REER)t = 00[log(REER*)t - log(REER)t-1] + 01(MP - MP*)t 
+ 82[log(NEER)t - log(NEER)t-1] (2) 
where, REER* = equilibrium real effective exchange rate 
MP= variable represen~ing macroeconomic (monetary and fiscal) policies 
MP* = macroeconomic policy variables consistent with the domestic GNP 
and money demand 
NEER = nominal effective exchange rate, LWiEi, with Wiand Ei defined as in 
Equation (1). 
Equation (2) indicates that changes in the actual real effective exchange rate, 
REER, are explained by three forces. The first force, represented by the expression 
[log(REER*)t - (REER)t-1], through a self-correcting mechanism, prevents the actual and 
equilibrium real effective exchange rates from drifting apart. A misalignment is 
' 
progressively corrected and the speed of this partial adjustment is measured by 00, whose 
values are constrained between O and 1. 
The second driving force of the movements of the REER is represented by (MP -
MP°). It captures the stance of the macroeconomic policies. The adoption of a fixed 
exchange rate regime imposes some restrictions on macroeconomic policies if 
misalignment is to be avoided. Macroeconomic policies that are inconsistent with the 
domestic GDP and money demand will be reflected in the REER via their effect on 
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relative prices. Policies that are more expansionary than required by the appropriate 
economic variables (MP > MP\ will induce an appreciation of the REER. In the 
following, the term (MP - MP*) will be represented by monetary and fiscal variables. The 
monetary variable is money supply (MONS), and the fiscal variable is proxied by fiscal 
deficits (FDEF). 
The third explanatory term in Equation (2), [log(NEER)t - log(NEER)t-1], is 
changes in the (logarithm) nominal effective exchange rate, and can be interpreted as a 
nominal devaluation variable, NOMDEV. A nominal devaluation is expected to depreciate 
the REER, at least in the short run. In order to capture the long-run effects of a 
devaluation on REER, k lags of the nominal devaluation variable are included in the 
equation. 
The final form of the actual REER equation to be estimated requires that the 
functional form of the equilibrium REER be first specified. It takes the form, 
log (REER*)t ='to+ -r1log(TOT)t + 'r2(CAPF)t + -r3log(INV)t 
+ 'r4log(TRES)t + Et 
where, TOT = terms of trade 
CAPF = capital flows 
INV = investment (standing for productivity change) 
TRES = trade restrictions 
Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (2), and taking into account k-lags of the 
nominal devaluation variable, gives (after rearranging), 
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(3) 
log(REER)t = So'to + (1 - So)log(REER)t-1 + 8o't1log(TOT)t + 8o't2(CAPF)t 
+ 8o-r3log(INV)t + 8o't4log(TRES)t + 811log(MONS)t + 812FDEFt 
+ Li82i(NOMDEV)t-i + Soct 
i = O, ... k. 
The equation to estimate takes the form, 
log(REER)t = cr0 + cr1log(REER)t-l + cr2log(TOT)t + cr3(CAPF)t 
+ Ci4log(INV)t + crslog(TRES)t + cr6log(MONS)t + cr1FDEFt 
+ Lcr8;(NOMDEV)t-i + et (4) 
The hypothesized signs of the explanatory variables are summarized in Table 3. If 
a devaluation has a permanent ( or relatively so) depreciating effect on REER, its lagged 
coefficients (or the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients) should be 
positive and statistically significant. 
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Table 3: Hypothesized Signs CREER) 
Short-run Equilibrium 
Determinants REER REER 
Appreciation/ Appreciation/ 
Deterioration of the terms of trade Depreciation Depreciation 
(-/+) (-/+) 
Appreciation/ Appreciation/ 
Productivity increase Depreciation Depreciation 
(-/+) (-/+) 
Capital inflow Appreciation Appreciation 
(-) (-) 
Trade restrictions Appreciation Appreciation 
(-) (-) 
Monetary expansion (Money supply) Appreciation 
(-) 
Fiscal expansion Appreciation 
(-) 
Nominal devaluation Depreciation 
(+) 
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Empirical Results for the CF A Zone 
Basically, this study is about the effects of a devaluation on international 
competitiveness ( as measured by the real effective exchange rate, or export and import 
growth) of the CF A countries. Therefore, real effective exchange rate, export, and import 
equations are estimated. 
Given the close relationship between a devaluation and some other economic 
variables, and in order to gauge the full effects of a CF A Franc devaluation, it is deemed 
important to also estimate inflation and output equations. 
The complete model (APPENDIX C), a system of five (5) equations, will be 
estimated for the whole CF A zone, and each of the BCEAO and BEAC regions. In this 
section, we consider the results for the REER equation for the CF A zone as a whole. 
Data and Preliminary analysis 
Data 
All the variables are annual data covering the period of 1972 to 1992. They are 
from the following sources (see Tables 4 and 5 for variable definitions and descriptive 
statistics. Some of the variables in those tables will be used for estimations in later 
chapters): 
1. International Financial Statistics - International Monetary Fund. various issues, 























Table 4: Variable Definitions 
Capital flows (Aggregate Net Transfers, a proxy for capital flows) 
Domestic inflation rate 
Foreign inflation rate 
Domestic interest rate 
Log of exports 
One-period lag of LEXP 
Log of government consumption (a proxy for fiscal deficits) 
Log of gross domestic product (GDP) 
Log of foreign GDP 
Log of imports 
One-period lag of LIMP 
Log of investment (a proxy for productivity change) 
Log of money supply (Ml definition) 
Log of real effective exchange rate 
One-period lag of LREER 
Log of real money supply (Ml definition) 
One-period lag of LRMONS 
Log of terms of trade 
Log of trade restrictions 
One-period lag of NOMDEV 
Nominal devaluation 
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Table 5: Descri12tive statistics 
Variables I Mean I Standard deviation I · Minimum l Maximum .·.· 
CAPF 116.24 187.59 -630.40 689.60 
INFLD 0.07 0.07 -0.09 0.27 
INFLF 6.85 3.18 2.60 13.40 
INTD 8.68 2.24 3.50 12.50 
LEXP 5.72 1.37 3.01 8.74 
LEXPl 5.63 1.38 2.77 8.12 
LGCONS 6.00 0.89 4.39 12.32 
LGDP 7.84 0.79 6.75 9.42 
LGDPF 13.72 0.47 12.89 14.76 
LIMP 6.04 0.97 3.52 8.58 
LIMPl 5.95 1.01 3.52 8.00 
LINV 6.17 0.96 3.37 8.33 
LMONS I 1.30 1.00 9.10 13.36 
LREER 4.48 0.44 3.77 5.45 
LREERl 4.50 0.45 3.77 5.45 
LRMONS 7.15 0.87 5.79 9.14 
LRMONSI 7.12 0.88 5.72 9.14 
LTOT 4.73 0.26 3.97 5.48 
LTRES 1.16 0.55 -0.16 2.94 
NOMDEI -0.01 0.12 -0.55 0.30 
NOMDEV · -0.01 0.12 -0.55 0.30 
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3. Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook- International Monetary Fund, 
various issues, 
4. IBRD World Tables - World Bank, various issues. 
Some variables are computed from raw data and, therefore need more explanation. 
1. Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER) 
This variable is a weighted average of the real bilateral exchange rates, 
as represented by equation ( 1 ). 
2. Trade Restrictions 
Following Ghura and Grennes (1993), the trade restrictions variable is defined 
as follows for a given country, i: 
TRESi = GDPi I (Exportsi + Importsi) 
This is the ratio of gross domestic product (GDP) over the sum of exports and 
imports. 
3. Nominal Devaluation 
The nominal devaluation is proxied by the first difference of the nominal 
effective exchange rate. The latter is computed as, 
NEERj = LWiEi 
where, 
NEERj = Nominal effective exchange rate of country j 
Wi = Weight corresponding to trading partner i 
Ei = Nominal bilateral exchange rate between country i and country j. 
Thus, the nominal devaluation (NOMDEV) of country j is, 
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NOMDEVj1 = NEERj1 - NEERj1-1 
Preliminary Analysis 
All the variables in Equation (4), are subject to unit root tests. The Augmented 
Dickey Fuller and Phillips - Perron unit root tests are conducted to assure stationarity. The 
appropriate critical values can be obtain from various sources. In our case, the test 
statistics and critical values are obtained from the statistical software package used. 
Significantly negative t-statistics correspond to a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
a unit root. The results of the unit root tests are reported in Table 6. With minor 
exceptions, the null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected for the variables included in the 
model. 
Thus, the variables can be best characterized as integrated of order zero, 1(0). This would 
avoid any implications for economic theory and modeling caused by nonstationarity, and 
therefore avoid the spurious regression phenomenon. 
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Table. 6: Unit Root Test Results 
Augmented Dickey - Fuller (ADF) Phillips - Perron (PP) 
Variables Without Trend With Trend Without Trend With Trend 
CAPF -4.52 -4.59 -6.49 -6.50 
INFLD -6.80 -7.29 -9.04 -9.18 
INFLF -6.07 -6.06 -5.69 -5.71 
INTD -4.40 -5.70 -7.57 -7.91 
LEXP -3.57 -3.61 -3.49 -3.53 
LEXPI -3.50 -3.54 -3.49 -3.53 
LGCONS -3.65 -3.64 -6.10 -6.10 
LGDP -2.37 -2.36 -2.46 -2.45 
LGDPF -2.56 -3.21 -2.54 -3.20 
LIMP -3.68 -3.68 -4.05 -4.05 
LIMP I -3:44 -3.46 -3.93 -3.93 
LINV -3.31 -3.27 -3.22 -3.22 
LMONS -3.98 -3.97 -4.11 -4.10 
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Table 6: Unit Root Test Results (continued) 
Augmented Dickey - Fuller (ADF) Phillips - Perron (PP) 
Variables Without Trend With Trend Without Trend With Trend 
LREER -2.25 -2.59 -2.75 -3.06 
LREERl -2.83 -3.08 -2.94 -3.21 
LRMONS -2.85 -2.85 -2.87 -2.87 
LRMONSl -2.82 -2.82 -2.86 -2.86 
LTOT -4.21 -4.99 -6.08 -6.09 
LTRES -4.58 -4.60 -5.50 -5.56 
NOMDEI -5.8i, -5.81 -10.77 -10.75 
NOMDEV -5.99 -5.99 -10.73 -10.72 
Sample: 1972 - 1992 
Notes: The ADF statistics are based on the t-statistics in the following OLS regressions: 
Ll Yr = CXo + a 1 Yr.1 + L)'j Ll Y 1•1 + E 1 (Without trend) 
Ll Yr = CXo + CX1 t + CX1 Yr.2 + L)'j Ll Y1.1 + Er (With trend) 
The Phillips - Perron unit root tests also are conducted. They use a non-parametric 
correction for serial correlation. 
The critical values are the same as those used for the Dickey - Fuller tests. 
The critical values are: 
-2.57 (Without Tend) 
-3.13 (With Trend) 
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Methodology 
The REER equation will be estimated·for the CFA zone as a whole (and each of 
the BCEAO and BEAC regions). The CFA zone comprises 14 countries, but because of 
data constraint, only 10 are considered. They are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The 
equation is, thus, estimated for 10 zone member countries for the period 1972 to 1992 (for 
a total of 210 observations). 
Given the definition of the trade restrictions variable (LTRES), it is considered as 
an endogenous_ variable. As pointed out by Ghura and Grennes ( 1993), "The CLOSE 
variable [LTRES in our case] is affected not only by trade policies but also by a number of 
other factors including the terms of trade and the RER itself'. 
Because the real effective exchange rate equation includes an endogenous variable 
(LTRES) as an explanatory term, and in order to take into account the particularities of 
the state of each economy included in the sample, the equation will be estimated using two 
stage least squares (2SLS), and a fixed effect procedure, with country specific dummy 
variables. 
Four versions of the REER equation are considered: 
1. The equation is estimated using all the explanatory variables as they appear in 
Equation (4), with the fiscal deficits variable (FDEF) replaced by LGCONS 
(log of government consumption) due to data unavailability. The LGCONS is 
thus interpreted as a fiscal policy variable. It should be noted that it can also be 
considered as one of the fundamentals determinants of real exchange rates. 
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Also in this version (as in the others), one lagged devaluation (NOMDEl) 
is included. 
2. In this version, the money supply variable (LMONS) is replaced by the 
domestic credit variable (LDCRE). In addition, the aggregate net transfers 
(proxy for capital flows) variable is replaced by its one-period-lagged variable 
(CAPFl). 
3. In this version, all the variables in version 1 are included, except the capital 
flows variable (CAPF). 
4. The main difference between this version and the others is that the government 
consumption variable (LGCONS) is left out. The LGCONS can be interpreted 
as a proxy for government consumption on nontradeable goods. Because the 
latter is unavailable, the total of government consumption (both on tradeables 
and nontradeables) is substituted for it. The purpose of its exclusion in this 
version is to see how it will affect the results. Also in this version the lagged 
domestic credit variable (LDCREl) is substituted for the money s_upply 
variable, (LMONS). 
Empirical Findings 
The determinants of real exchange rates are of two types (real variables or 
fundamentals, and monetary variables). This distinction is important as changes in the 
real variables affect only the equilibrium real exchange rate, while movements in the short-
run real exchange rates are due to either type of determinants. Knowledge of these 
determinants and the estimates of their quantitative effects on the real exchange rate can 
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help avoid exchange rate misalignment, by keeping the actual exchange rate at ( or close 
to) its equilibrium level. 
Most important to us in this study, are the effects of a nominal devaluation on the 
real exchange rate. This is investigated, and the empirical results, based on the different 
versions of Equation (4), are summarized in Table 7. Almost all the estimated coefficients 
have the expected signs (see Table 3 for postulated signs). 
The international terms of trade (LTOT), a real variable, is expected to have either 
sign depending on whether the shock is due to export price or import price change, and on 
the substitution and income effects. The estimated terms of trade coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant in all four versions. This is an indication that an improvement in · 
external terms of trade of a given country will be associated with an appreciation of its real 
exchange rate (at least in the CFA countries under investigation). This result sheds some 
light on the theoretical ambiguity related to the effect of external terms of trade on the real 
exchange rate as discussed earlier. 
The technological improvement variable, proxied by (log of) investment (LINV) is 
also expected to either appreciate or depreciate the real exchange rate depending on the 
sector in which the technological progress occurred. The results point at a technological 
improvement occurring in the tradeable sector in the CF A countries. The estimated 
coefficient ( of LINV) is statistically significant and negative in all the four versions of 
Equation ( 4 ). 
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Table 7: Real Effective Exchange Rate Equation Results, LREER (CFA zone) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 








LTRES -0.036t -0.073§ -0.022 -0.010 
(-1.57) (-2.64) (-1.27) (-0.48) 
LMONS -0.011 -0.007 
(-0.85) (0.65) 
LREERl 0.908§ 0.723§ 0.925§ 0.961 § 
(28.97) (17.56) (33.13) (32.91) 
LTOT -0.062§ -0.161§ -0.051§ -0.040:j: 
(-3.15) (-4.63) (-2.85) (-2.05) 
LINV -0.029§ -0.081 § -0.037§ -0.036§ 
(-2.64) (-5.70) (-3.69) (-4.01) 
LGCONS -0.008 -0.029§ -0.009 
(-1.10) (-2.68) (-1.19) 
NOMDEV 0.897§ 0.850§ 0.908§ 0.929§ 
(21.45) (14.60) (22.41) (23.50) 
NOMDEl -0.015 0.178§ -0.020 -0.053+ 
(-0.39) (3.06) (-0.55) (-1.47) 
N 210 210 210 210 
R2 0.9831 0.9654 0.9838 0.9846 
All versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
N is the number of observations 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level 
+ Significant at 5 % level 
§ Significant at 1 % level 
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Trade policy is another important variable that explains real exchange rates. In the 
theoretical model, it was postulated that trade restrictions will limit the openness of an 
economy to international trade, and will result in an appreciation of its real exchange rate. 
This is confirmed by the coefficient estimate of the trade restrictions variable (LTRES). In 
all the four versions the coefficient is negative, and statistically significant in three ( 1, 2, 
and 3). This is an indication that in a fixed exchange rate regime in general, and in CFA 
countries in particular, loosening trade restrictions not only will expose those countries to 
the benefits of the global trade environment, but also will help them avoid misalignment of 
their currencies. 
The capital flows variable (CAPF or CAPFl) has a negative coefficient estimate 
(as expected), but is statistically significant in only one equation. Government 
consumption is also postulated to appreciate the real exchange rate. As indicated before, 
this variable stands for either the fiscal policy (due to data unavailability on fiscal ·deficits), 
or government consumption on nontradeables. Its coefficient is (as expected) negative in 
all the three versions ( 1, 2, and 3) in which it is included. Its statistical significance is, 
however, confirmed in only one of the three versions (2). Version (4) is estimated without 
the (log of) government consumption variable (LGCONS). This exclusion did not have 
any significant effect on the estimates of the other coefficients. 
The lagged LREER (LREERl) has coefficient estimates ranging from 0.723 to 
0.961. These results are similar to those found in Edwards (1989a) which are also quite 
high. Edwards ( 1989a) claims that: 
In a way this is not too surprising in light of the analysis of 
the time series properties of RERs ... From an economic 
prospective these high values for the coefficients imply that 
in the absence of other intervention, actual real exchange 
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rates converge very slowly toward their: long-run equilibrium 
level. (pp.141). 
The money supply (monetary variable) coefficient is negative as postulated, 
although not statistically significant in the two versions in which LMONS is included. In 
version (2), the money supply variable is replaced by (log of) domestic credit (LDCRE). 
Its coefficient is negative and statistically significant. In all, their is an indication that 
expansionary monetary policy appreciates the CFA currency. This result is in line with the 
position took by the CFA zone monetary authorities (from the mid-1980s) to address the 
appreciation of the CF A franc by opting for a contractionary monetary policy, as shown by 
the money supply variable for a selected CF A zone countries (Figure 7). 
The main question we are concerned with is the effects of the nominal devaluation 
variable, NOMDEV, and its lagged variable, NOMDEl, on REER. We postulated that the 
coefficients of NOMDEV and NOMDEl (or their sum) must be positive and statistically 
significant ifa nominal devaluation is to have any contemporaneous (short-run) and long-
run ( or relatively so) real depreciating effects on the CF A franc. The results show without 
ambiguity that a nominal devaluation will have a short-run depreciation effect on the CFA 
Franc. The parameter esdmates (of NOMDEV) range from (a positive) 0.850 to 0.929 
and are all statistically significant. These results are very similar to those found in Rouis et 
al. ( 1994). Their estimate of the contemporaneous effect is 0.88. Given the results in our 
study, a IO percent nominal devaluation in a given year will lead to a real depreciation of 
8.50 to 9.29 percent in the same year, ceteris paribus. 
The coefficient estimate of the lagged nominal devaluation variable (NOMDE I) 
has mixed signs. It is positive in one of the versions, 2 (and statistically significant), and 
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Figure 7.2: Money Supply, M1 (1985=100) 
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Source: International Financial Statistics 
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negative in three (1, 3, and 4) and significant in only one, (4). A test of the hypothesis that 
"the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients is zero", however, leads to the 
conclusion that a nominal devaluation will have a permanent real depreciating effect on the 
CFA Franc (as the null hypothesis was rejected). There is, thus, a support to the view that 
a nominal devaluation of the CF A franc will help the zone countries regain their 
international competitiveness even in the long run. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPORT AND IMPORT GROWTH 
After determining the impact of nominal devaluation on real exchange rate, another 
point to be considered is the response of exports and imports to changes in the real 
exchange rate. A real depreciation following a nominal devaluation may not be the end-
issue, but how it induces a reallocation of resources from nontradeable to tradeable 
sectors, and most importantly, its impact on exports and imports. One of the ultimate 
objectives of a currency devaluation is its expansionary and contractionary effects on 
exports and imports, respectively, via its impact on the real exchange rate. Thus, two 
important conditions for a nominal devaluation to bring about the expected results are its 
ability to depreciate the real exchange rate, and the tradeable sector to respond favorably 
to the latter. 
Export Demand 
Like any demand function, aggregate export demand is a function of relative price. 
In empirical research, the relative price in· the export demand function can be expressed 
differently. For the purpose of the present study, it represents the real effective exchange 
rate as defined in Equation (1 ). A higher foreign price (P*) or a depreciation of 
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the domestic nominal exchange rate, E, makes domestic goods relatively cheaper abroad 
and thereby induces more demand for domestic exports. The opposite is true for a higher 
domestic price (P). In addition to the relative price, export demand depends on the level of 
real output in foreign countries (Y*). 
Taking into account the fact that Sub-Saharan African countries' exports and 
imports are generally believed to be subject to quantitative restrictions by industrial· 
countries, and particularly that the region's trade flows are severely affected by its own 
trade policies, the export demand equation (in logarithm form) is expressed as follows1, 
logX/ = <po+ cpilog(REER)t + <p2logY*1 + <p3log(TRES)t + µt (5) 
where, TRES = trade restrictions variable. 
i = a given country (CFA country in our case) 
t = time. 
Because the equation is in logarithm form, the parameters <p1, cp2, and cp3, represent 
relative price, income, and trade-restriction, elasticities, respectively, and their signs are 
postulated as follows, 
<p, > 0, <p2 > 0, and <p3 < 0. 
Implicit in Equation (5), is that there is no time lag for adjustment from actual 
export (Xi) to the (equilibrium) export demand (X/). Therefore, the actual export is 
always equal to the export demand (Xi= X/ ). This restrictive assumption can be relaxed 
and a disequilibrium equation specified, and which allows for a partial adjustment 
mechanism2. 
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To introduce this type of framework, changes in exports are assumed to be caused 
by any disequilibrium between demand for export in period t, and actual export in the 
previous period, t-1, 
.1.logXir = logXi1 - logXi1-1 = A(logX/ - log Xit-1) 
0 ~ A ~ I 
where, A measures the speed of adjustment. 
Substituting Equation (5) into (6), and rearranging terms gives, 
logXit = Acpo + Acp1log(REER)t + Acp2logYi* + Acp3log(TRES)t 
+ (1 - A)logXiL1-1 + A µt 
(6) 
where, Acp1, Acp2, and Acp3, are the short-run relative price, income, and trade-restriction, 
elasticities, respectively. 
The export equation to estimate has the form, 
logXii = 80 + 81log(REER)t + ~logYt' + ~log(TRES)t + 04}ogXjL-l + Ut (7) 
Import Demand 
Aggregate import demand equation for country i can be written as a function of 
the relative price, domestic income, and trade restrictions variables. 
logM/ = ~o + ~ilog(REER)t + ~2logYt + ~3log(TRES)t + et 
where, Mi1d = import demand 
Y = domestic real income 
= a given country (CFA country in our case) 
t = time 
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(8) 
A lower domestic price, P, higher nominal exchange rate E (depreciation), or higher 
foreign price forces domestic consumers to substitute away from importables as they 
become relatively more expensive. The expected signs of the parameters are, 
~1 < 0, ~2 > 0, ~3 < 0. 
Here again, instead of assuming that domestic importers are always on their 
demand curve (Mid= Mi), a partial adjustment mechanism is introduced by assuming that 
disequilibrium between demand for imports in period t and actual imports in the previous 
period, t-1, explains changes in imports, 
~logMit = logMic - logMic-1 = cp(logMi/ - log Mit-1) 
0 ~<I>~ I 
(9) 
where, <I> is the adjustment coefficient. Substituting Equation (8) into Equation (9) and 
rearranging terms gives, 
logMit = <P~o + <P~ilog(REER)t + <P~21ogYt + q>~3log(TRES)t 
+ (1 - cp)logMit-1 + <pet 
where <1>~1, cp~2, and cp~3, are short-run relative price, income, and trade-restriction, 
elasticities, respectively. 
The import· equation to estimate has the form, 
A point worth mentioning is that the partial-adjustment mechanism considered in both 
export and import equations assumes a small country case where both export and import 
prices are determined exogenously. 
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Empirical results 
Our finding in chapter 3 that a nominal devaluation can have a real depreciation 
effect on the CF A Franc is not enough to make a strong case for a nominal devaluation as 
a policy instrument. How exports and imports react to changes in real exchange rate is 
another import issue. The theoretical analysis of the export and import equations above 
prepares us for the nex.t step of empirically testing the responsiveness of exports and 
imports to changes in real exchange rate. 
Before presenting the results, some preliminary discussions are in order. As in the 
previous analysis (in chapter 3), all the variables included in the export and import 
equations are subject to unit root tests (Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perro) to avoid 
problems caused by nonstationarity. The variables used are annual data and cover the 
period from 1972 to 1992. The nominal and real effective exchange rates (NEER, REER, 
respectively), trade restrictions (LTRES), and foreign gross domestic product (LGDPF), 
variables are defined as follows: 
1. The nominal and real effective exchange rates and trade restrictions variables 
are as defined in previous chapters. 
2. Foreign gross domestic product (LGDPF): 
This variable represents a weighted sum of the gross domestic products of the 
10 most important importing countries from a given CFA country G). 
GDPF.i = GDPg * Weightsi 
where, 
GDPF.i = foreign gross domestic product for country j (a CPA country). 
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GDPFi = a matrix where the columns are represented by the GDP of country j's 
10 most important foreign countries i (in terms of country j's exports to those 
countries; i = 1, 2 ... 10). 
Weightsi = weights corresponding to trading partner i (these are the same 
weights, W, used to compute the REER in equation (1)). 
Starting with exports, different versions of equation (7) are estimated and the 
empirical results are summarized in Table 8. The first two versions (1 and 2) are estimated 
using (log of ) real effective exchange rate (LREER) as relative price. The last two 
versions (3 and 4) include (log of) nominal effective exchange rate (LNEER) as relative 
price. The trade restrictions variable (LTRES) is left out of versions 2 and 4 for 
comparison purposes. 
All the parameter estimates have the expected signs in all four versions. However, 
the versions (1 and 3) that include the LTRES variable fit the data better than those 
without it, based on the adjusted R2 (0.9621 and 0.9628 compared to 0.9482 and 0.9489, 
respectively). In addition, the LTRES coefficient is negative and statistically significant in 
the two versions 1 and 3. This is an indication that trade policies play an important role in 
international trade flows in the CPA countries. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the foreign GDP variable 
(LGDP) shows that growth in foreign importing countries is important for export growth 
in CF A countries. 
The explanatory variable of particular importance in the export equation 1s 
represented by the real or nominal exchange rate variable. The coefficient of LREER is 
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Table 8: Export Equation Results, LEXP (CFA zone) 
Variables 2 3 4 
LREER 0.216t 0.161 
(1.35) (0.82) 
LNEER 0.18U 0.188 
(l.64) (1.25) 
LGDPF 0.645§ 0.813§ 0.683§ 0.857§ 
{3.57) (3.93) (3.76) (4.07) 
LEXPl 0.486§ 0.625§ 0.469§ 0.605§ 
(9.46) (13.37) (8.92) (12.25) 
LTRES -0.386§ -0.380§ 
(-4.30) (-4.29) 
N 210 210 210 210 
R2 0.9621 0.9482 0.9628 0.9489 
All versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
N is the number of observations 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level 
:j: Significant at 5 % level 
§ Significant at 1 % level 
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Table 9: Import Equation Results. LIMP (CFA zone) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
LREER -0.157§ -0.318§ 
(-2.34) (-3.43) 
LNEER -0.153§ -0.223§ 
(-2.79) (2.83) 
LGDP 0.611 § 0.250§ 0.658§ 0.304§ 
(7.04) (2.33) (7.68) (2.75) 
LIMPl 0.374§ 0.740§ 0.367§ 0.746§ 
(7.08) (19.44) (7.12) (19.53) 
LTRES -0.523§ -0.534§ 
(-7.98) (-8.44) 
N 210 210 210 210 
Rz 0.9785 0.9557 0.9790 0.9553 
All versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
N is the number of observations 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level 
i Significant at 5 % level 
§ Significant at 1 % level 
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positive in both versions (1 and 2) as is the coefficient of LNEER in versions (3) and (4). 
Two out of four of these coefficients are statistically significant in (1) and (3) (the versions 
that include LTRES ). Considering real effective exchange rate and its definition, the 
results indicate that a real depreciation of the CF A Franc will be associated with higher 
export growth. The CF A countries can enjoy a 2.16 percent export growth 
following a 10 percent real depreciation of the CFA Franc (based on version 1). Thus, a · 
nominal devaluation of the CFA Franc will not only depreciate the currency (in real 
terms), but will also lead to an increase in exports. 
Turning to the imports equation, the empirical results are also encouraging for the 
member countries (Table 9). Again, this equation is estimated using different combinations · 
of the explanatory variables. As in the export equation, including the trade policy variable 
(LTRES) improves the fit, based on the adjusted R2 (0.9785 and 0.9790 compared to 
0.9557 and 0.9553): 
The coefficient of LTRES is negative and statistically significant in the two 
versions ( 1 and 3) in which it is included. This confirms our earlier claim that the trade 
policies in place in the CFA zone adversely affected the zone's trade flows. Economic 
growth in those countries (increase in domestic GDP) increases imports to the zone. The 
parameter estimate of the GDP variable is positive and statistically significant in all four 
versions. 
The main question we want to answer with the estimation of this equation is 
whether real depreciation will reduce imports to the zone. Using either LREER or 
LNEER, the parameter estimate is negative in all four versions, and statistically significant. 
We can then conclude that lower imports should be expected following a real depreciation 
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of the CFA Franc. A reduction of 1.57 percent to 3.18 percent in imports can be brought 
about by a real depreciation of 10 percent of the CFA Franc. 
These results (exports and imports effects of a nominal devaluation), however, 
should be handled with care, especially regarding the response of imports to relative price 
change immediately following a depreciation. The adjustment of imports and exports to 
relative price change occurs only slowly due to consumer- and producer-response lags. As 
a consequence, imports may increase (and exports decrease) in the short run following a 
depreciation. This is known as the J-curve effect. Thus our results can be best interpreted 
as the response of imports and exports after all ( or most of the) adjustments take place. 
We can confirm (based on our results) that a CFA nominal devaluation is capable 
of depreciating the currency (in real terms). Moreover, exports and imports are sensitive 
to changes in the real exchange rate such that an improvement in the trade balance should 
be expected as a result of a devaluation of the CF A Franc. 
I. See Khan ( 1974), for a discussion on empirical estimates of similar equation. 
2. See Khan (1974), Bahmany-Oskooee (1984) for more details. 
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CHAPTERV 
DEVALUATION, INFLATION, AND 
REAL OUTPUT 
The basic objective in this chapter is to investigate·· the effects of a nominal 
devaluation on inflation and real output. These are covered in sections one and two. An 
additional section (section three) is included to present the empirical results of the effects 
of devaluation on economic variables (real exchange rate, exports, imports, inflation and 
real output) of the BEAC and BCEAO regions. 
The analysis so far points to the fact that a nominal devaluation can help a country 
regain its international competitiveness and improve its trade balance, provided that some 
conditions are met. However, and as aforementioned, critics assert that devaluation is a 
risky approach because of the high inflation it entails, and may hurt domestic output as 
well, especially in the case of small, -intermediate-goods-importing countries. As 
Nashabishi (1983) indicates, 
But behind every devaluation looms the danger of inflationary 
pressures for higher incomes, which will raise costs and 
increase the likelihood of monetary expansion to accommodate 
the higher demand. The result of monetary expansion will be a 
jump in prices, fueling inflationary expectations and the demand 
for foreign currency - both as a hedge against inflation and in 
anticipation of a further devaluation. Apart from the negative 
impact this will have on the external payments position, it 
will set in motion another devaluation and a new jump in prices. 
Such an inflation-devaluation spiral can be very damaging, 
not only because it fails to correct the disequilibrium but also 
because its undermines the credibility of exchange rate 
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depreciation as a policy instrument. 
This warning provides a good reason for analyzing inflation and output growth when 
studying the effects of devaluation. 
In the case of inflation, there is no denying that the price level will rise in the wake 
of a devaluation. The question is how severe will it be and how can it be contained. The 
uncertainty about the effect of a devaluation on real output is even more pronounced as 
different theoretical and empirical studies on the issue almost always land · on different 
grounds. 
The inflation process 
With an economy composed of two sectors (tradeable and nontradeables), the 
domestic price level is an average of prices in those two sectors. In the tradeable sector 
( given a small country case), prices of imports and exports are exogenously determined in 
the world market, and excess demand/supply is reflected in the trade balance (the fixed 
exchange rate case). Movements in tradeable prices measured in domestic currency are 
due only to price developrp.ents in the world markets ( changes in export and import prices, 
measured in foreign currency) and changes in the nominal exchange rate. In the 
nontradeable sector, however, prices adjust to the supply and demand conditions to clear 
the market. Excess demand in this market can be proxied by an excess supply of domestic 
liquidity, 
log(MIP)t-1 - log(MIP)/ 
where, 
log(MIP)/ =Po+ pdogY1 + P2(INTD)t (or real money demand) (11) 
71 
(M/P) 1-1 = real money supply at time t-1 
t = time 
Y = domestic real output 
INTD = domestic interest rate 
The output condition is specified as the ratio between (actual) real output and its 
potential level, (Y/YoeT). 
where, Y = actual real output 
YO = initial output level 
u = potential (steady-state) growth rate 
T = time trend 
In sum, the domestic rate of inflation, ~logPd, is assumed to be positively related 
to excess supply of domestic liquidity, excess real output above its potential level (in the 
nontradeable sector), and movements in the tradeable prices, PT1. In equation form, 
~logPd = <P1[1og(MIP)1.1 - log(MIP)/] + <l>2log(Y/ Yoe0T) + <l>3~logPT (12) 
The price of tradeables is defined as foreign price level in domestic currency, 
PT = (NEER)P* 
where, 
NEER = nominal effective exchange rate 
p* = foreign price level in foreign currency. 
logPT = log(NEER) + log p* 
~logPT = ~log(NEER) + ~log p* (I 3) 
Substituting Equations (11) and ( 13) into Equation (12) and rearranging terms gives, 
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dlogPd = -(cf>1po+ cf>2log Yo)+ cf>1log(MIP)1-1 + (cf>2- cf>1p1)logYt - cf>1P2(INTD)1 
+ cf>3dlog(NEER)1 + cf>3dlog P / + cf>2uT 
Talcing into account k-lags of dlog(NEER), the equation to be estimated talces the form, 
INFLD1 ='Po+ 'l'ilog(RMONS)t-1 + 'l'2log(GDP)1 + \f3(INTD)1 + Li'l'4i(NOMDEV)1-i 
(14) 
where, 
INFLD = domestic inflation (standing for dlogPd) 
NOMDEV = ~log(NEER), 
INFLF = ~log p* (or foreign inflation). 
RMONS = MIP (real money supply) 
GDP =Y 
Devaluation and Real Output 
The short- and long-run effects of a devaluation on real output are as controversial 
as its long-run effect on the real exchange rate. A number of economists studied the 
relationship, but arrived at no definite conclusion (Cooper, 1971; Edwards, 1986; 
Gylfason and Risager, 1984). These studies use different methodologies (before and after 
approach, control group approach, simulation model or reduced-form equations, and 
econometric approach) to determine the effects of a devaluation on economic performance 
(real output). 
The approach here is to apply econometric methods to time-series cross-section 
data to examine the relationship between devaluation (and assuming that devaluation is 
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capable of having a real depreciation effect) and real output. The basic equation takes the · 
following form 
logGDP1 = 'lfo + '1'1log(TOT)1 + '1'2log(RMONS)1 + 'lf3log(GCONS)1 (15) 
+ L'l'4ilog(REER)1-i + e1 
where, TOT = terms of trade 
RMONS . = real Money supply 
GCONS = government consumption 
REER 
t 
= real effective exchange rate 
=time 
The terms of trade effects on economic growth are ambiguous in the theoretical 
literature. An improvement in the terms of trade may lead to an appreciation of the 
equilibrium real exchange rate (lack of profitability in the tradeable sector), and thereby 
lower economic growth. However, if the improvement in the terms of trade is due to 
lower import prices relative to export prices, it may stimulate economic growth as 
production activities become more profitable. 
Money supply, on the other hand, is hypothesized to boost aggregate demand, and 
thereby, increase real output at least in the short run. Fiscal policy is captured by the 
government spending variable, and is expectec:l to increase real output as well. The 
explanatory variable of interest in this equation is the real effective exchange rate. A 
negative coefficient will indicate that devaluation is contractionary. A positive coefficient, 
on the other hand, will confirm the view that devaluation is expansionary. 
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Empirical results 
Inflation is always a concern with devaluation. By making imports dearer to 
domestic consumers, devaluation fuels domestic inflation. This is one of the reasons raised 
by the opponents of a devaluation policy. Inflation is, thus, unavoidable in the aftermath of 
a devaluation (at least in the short run). 
The analysis of the inflation equation in this study will provide an empirical 
estimate of the contribution of each factor to the general price level. In Equation (14), the 
domestic inflation variable (INFLD), is defined as the first difference of (log of) consumer 
price index, CPI. 
The expected signs of the explanatory variables are summarized in Table 10. 
Higher (real) money supply in the economy increases aggregate demand, and therefore is 
expected to increase the general price level. Given the nature of the CF A countries, with 
high reliance on imports of final as well as intermediate goods, domestic inflation is highly 
influenced by the foreign price level. As such, foreign inflation (INFLF) is postulated to be 
positively related to domestic inflation in the CF A countries. 
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Table 10: Domestic Inflation Equation (Expected signs) 
Variables 
Money Supply, LRMONS1 
Gross Domestic Product, GDP 
Interest Rate (Domestic), INTD 
Foreign Inflation, INFLF 
Nominal Devaluation (Contemporaneous), MOMDEV 








Excess actual output over its potential level is expected to increase inflation while 
a higher interest rate is postulated to reduce it. To assess the short- and long-run effects of 
a nominal devaluation on domestic inflation, contemporaneous and one-period lagged 
nominal devalul;ltion variables are included in the equation. Positive signs of the 
coefficients of these variables will support the general view that devaluation is inflationary. 
Two versions of Equation (14) are estimated. As the results (presented in Table 
11) show, almost all the coefficients have the expected signs. Expansionary monetary 
policy is inflationary. The coefficient of the real money supply (LRMONS 1) is positive in 
the two versions (1 and 2) and statistically significant. 
The coefficient of GDP is negative in the two versions ( 1 and 2) and statistically 
significant. The interest rate coefficient is, as expected, negative in version (1) in which it 
is included, but statistically insignificant. Foreign inflation, on the other hand, is confirmed 
to have a positive influence on domestic inflation. Its coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant in the two versions. 
The nominal devaluation variable does confirm the traditional view of higher 
inflation following a devaluation. The contemporaneous and lagged coefficients came up 
positive and statistically significant. Higher inflation is, thus, the norm in the aftermath of a 
devaluation. This, however, can be controlled through adequate demand management 
policy in order not to allow a surge in the price of nontradeable goods. 
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The two versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
N is the number of observations 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level 
:j: Significant at 5 % leve_l 
§ Significant at 1 % level 
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· The next empirical investigation involves the relationship between nominal 
devaluation and real output. As aforementioned, the theoretical and empirical treatment of 
· this relationship has been controversial. More studies are required to resolve the 
controversy. 
Again in this estimation, the variables are annual data (ranging from 1972 to 1992) 
and are defined as in previous chapters. To assess the effects of a nominal devaluation in 
the short and long run, both the real exchange rate (LREER) and its lag (LREERI) are 
included in the equation. The empirical results are presented in Table 12. 
Starting with the terms of trade variable (LTOT), we postulated that changes in 
the terms of trade have ambiguous effects on real output. Our results confirm that view. 
The coefficients of the terms of trade variable has opposite signs in the two versions ( 1 
and 2) and are statistically insignificant. This result is consistent with that reached in 
Edwards ( 1986). In his study, Edwards (1986) concluded that "Regarding the coefficient 
of 't [terms of trade] the results show that ... changes in the terms of trade have no 
perceptive effect on real output in developing countries". 
Expansionary monetary policy, as represented by the real money supply, on the 
other hand, does impact real output. Its coefficient is positive in the two versions and 
statistically significant. This study did not investigate any long-run effect of money supply 
(which according to the traditional view calls for money neutrality). However, our results 
strongly support a short-run positive effect of money supply on real output. 
Like the money supply, government consumption in a given year has a 
contemporaneous positive impact on real output. This is an encouraging result for 
developing countries (CFA countries in particular) where the public sector represents an 
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The two versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
N is the number of observations 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level 
:j: Significant at 5 % level 

















important proportion of the economy. But this should not be interpreted as a support for a 
larger government since, as proven by numerous studies, the private sector can do even 
better than the government, especially in developing countries. 
The next two variables (LREER and LREERI) in the equation are of particular 
interest. Given that a nominal devaluation has a real depreciation effect, will real output 
react positively to the latter? If so, then devaluation will be characterized as expansionary, 
and in terms of equation (14), the coefficient of LREER or LREERI must be positive (or 
at least their sum should be). Based on the results, real output will contract in the short 
run following a devaluation. The coefficient of LREER is negative in the two versions and 
statistically significant. However, in the second year following the devaluation, real output 
will rebound and compensate for the losses incurred during the first year (based on the 
magnitude of the positive and statistically significant lagged LREER variable in the two 
versions). Assuming that the CFA countries' monetary authorities design a sound 
accompanying demand management policy to contain domestic inflation (to maintain the· 
achieved real depreciation), a nominal devaluation will be expansionary (at ~orse, neutral) 
in the long run. 
Although some researchers reached the conclusion . that devaluation is 
contractionary, their results should be interpreted with caution due to the nature of the 
developing countries. Despite their conclusion that devaluation is contractionary in the 
developing countries, Gylfason and Risager ( 1984) pointed out that there are three factors 
which all tend to bias the results toward a contractionary devaluation view: 
... the improvement of the current account is achieved at 
the cost of a reduction of GNP. This reduction, however, 
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should be viewed in the light of three factors all of which 
tend to bias the results in this direction. First, we assumed 
conservatively that the elasticity of substitution is as low 
as 0.3 in the LDCs as well as in Portugal and Spain. Second, 
available national income accounts statistics for these countries 
attribute too low a share of GDP to labor with the result that 
the aggregate supply schedule in the present framework is 
unduly steep. Third, as said above, practically all the countries 
in the sample carry a heavy debt burden. All these factors 
increase the probability that devaluation reduces GNP. On 
the other hand, devaluation generally stimulates GNP in the 
industrial countries ... 
Devaluation and the BEAC and BCEAO Regions 
In this section, we consider the two regions of the CF A zone, namely the BEAC 
and BCEAO regions. The analysis to this point was.devoted to the CFA zone as a whole. 
The following presents the empirical results for each region. 
The theoretical analysis is the same. as before, only that in this part, the samples 
used in the estimation differ. In the BCEAO region, the countries included in the sample 
are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d' Ivoire, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The BEAC sample 
includes Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, and Gabon. The variables are 
annual data ranging from 1972 to 1992 (for each country) for a total of 126 and 84 
observations for the BCEAO and BEAC regions, respectively. 
As in the case of the zone as a whole, five different equations are estimated for 
each region. They are real effective exchange rate, exports, imports, inflation, and real 
output. The results are summarized in Tables 13 to 17. 
Regarding the REER equation (Table 13), all the coefficients have the postulated 
signs. The capital flows (CAPP), and money supply (LMONS) coefficients, however, are 
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Table 13: Real Effective Exchange Rate Equation Results. LREER (BEAC and BCEAO) 
Variables BEAC BCEAO 
CAPF -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.69) (-0.31) 
LTRES -0.051 t -0.027 
(-1.62) (-1.09) 
LMONS -0.010 -0.010 
(-0.56) (-0.62) 
LREERl 0.952§ 0.962§ 
.(26.33) (18.84) 
LTOT -0.042t -0.071§ 
(-1.50) (-2.48) 
.LINV -0.012 -0.052§ 
(-0.86) (-3.56) 
LGCONS -0.005 -0.013t 
(-0.35) (-1.42) 
NOMDEV 0.989§ 0.870§ 
(21.07) (13.39) 
NOMDEl -0.107§ -0.015 
(-2.33) (-0.27) 
N 84 126 
R2 0.9915 0.9692 
The two versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
N is the number of observations 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level · 
:j: Significant at 5 % level 
§ Significant at l % level 
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Table 14: Export Equation Results. LEXP {BEAC and BCEAO) 
Variables BEAC 










The two versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. · 
N is the number of observations 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level 
:j: Significant at 5 % level 













Table 15: Import Equation Results. LIMP (BEAC and BCEAO) 
Variables BEAC BCEAO 
LREER -0.239t -0.298§ 
(-1.56) (-3.21) 
LGDP 0.882§ 0.914§ 
(4.57) (6.53) 
LIMPl 0.230t 0.270§ 
(1.62) (3.92) 
LTRES -0.519§ -0.653§ 
(-3.03) (-7.77) 
N. 84 126 
R2 0.9778 0.9791 
The two versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
N is the number of observations 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level 
:j: Significant at 5 % level 
§ Significant at 1 % level 
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statistically insignificant in the two equations (representing the two regions). The other 
coefficients are statistically significant in at least one equation. 
As in the case of the zone, nominal devaluation is found to have a real depreciation effect 
on the CF A currency in each region. The contemporaneous coefficient of NOMDEV is 
positive and statistically significant in the two equations (0.989 and 0.870 for the BEAC 
and BCEAO, respectively). The lagged coefficient is negative in the two cases (and 
statistically significant in the case of BEAC and insignificant in the other). 
However, the magnitude of the lagged coefficient is far less compared to the 
contemporaneous one. In fact, a test of the hypothesis that the sum of the 
contemporaneous and lagged coefficients is zero is rejected in the two cases (BEAC and 
BCEAO). This means that nominal devaluation will have a long-run effect in each of he 
two regions. 
In the export and import equations (Tables 14 and 15, respectively), the trade 
restrictions variable is included to account for the trade policies in the two regions. Its 
coefficient is negative in the two equations, again confirming the claim that trade 
restrictions reduce international trade flows in the zone. In the export equation , the other 
coefficients are positive (as expected) and statistically significant. The LREER coefficient 
is higher in magnitude for the BCEAO compared to that of the BEAC (0.370 and 0.261, 
respectively). The main result, however, is that real depreciation will lead to export 
growth in the two regions. As in the export equation, the parameter estimates in the 
import equation have the postulated signs and statistically significant. The coefficient of 
the LREER is almost the same for the two regions, and shows that a 10 percent real 
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depreciation will reduce import demand by 2.39 and 2.98 percent for the BEAC and 
BCEAO, respectively. 
Regarding the inflation equation (Table 16), the real money supply, foreign 
inflation, and nominal devaluation have positive effect on inflation in each of the regions. 
As claimed before, nominal devaluation will be inflationary in either the BEAC or BCEAO 
region. Higher interest rates have a negative effect on inflation rates (although the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant in the case of BCEAO). 
In the last equation, (real output, Table 17), the LTOT coefficient has opposite 
signs (negative and statistically significant for the BEAC, and positive and insignificant for 
the BCEAO). The real money supply (LRMONS) and government consumption 
(LGCONS), on the other hand, have unambiguous positive effects on real output in the 
two regions (both coefficients are positive and statistically significant). The 
contemporaneous LREER coefficient, although negative, is much different in magnitude 
for the BEAC and BCEAO regions (-0.206 and -0.717, respectively). The 
contemporaneous output contraction in the BCEAO region is much more pronounced. 
The lagged coefficient, however, is similar (0.271 and 0.293 for the BEAC and BCEAO, 
respectively. 
We can conclude that in the first two years following a depreciation, output 
contraction is likely in the BCEAO region, while growth of output in the BEAC region in 
the second year will compensate for the losses incurred during the first year. If we 
consider a longer period (which we did not attempt in this study) and assume that the 
initial real depreciation is preserved, the output performance is likely to be brighter. 
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Table 16: Domestic Inflation Equation Results (BEAC and BCEAO) 
Variables BEAC BCEAO 
LRMONSl 0.104§ 0.118§ 
(3.49) (2.69) 
LGDP 0.011 -0.096§ 
(0.40) (-2.53) 
INTD -0.016:j: -0.002 
(-2.07) (-0.24) 
NOMDEV 0.031 0.086t 
(0.83) (1.55) 
NOMDEVl 0.113§ 0.094t 
(2.93) (1.54) 
INFLF 0.009§ 0.009§ 
(4.09) (3.25) 
T -0.000 -0.004t 
(-0.23) (-1.62) 
N 84 126 
R2 0.6396 0.4363 
The two versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
N is the number of observations 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level 
:j: Significant at 5 % level 
§ Significant at 1 % level 
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Table 17: Real Output Equation Results, LGDP (BEAC and BCEAO) 
Variables BEAC BCEAO 
LTOT -0.223§ 0.075 
(-4.81) (1.12) 
LRMONS 0.918§ 0.939§ 
(15.05) (14.23) 
LGCONS 0.282§ 0.102§ 
(8.20) (3.93) 
LREER -0.206:j: -0.717§ 
(-1.807) (-4.14) 
LREERl 0.271§ 0.293:j: 
(2.62) (l.97) 
N 84 126 
R2 0.9824 0.9329 
The two versions included country-specific dummy variables. 
R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
N is the number of observations. 
The numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
t Significant at 10 % level 
:j: Significant at 5 % level 
§ Significant at 1 % level 
1. See Otani and Sassanpour ( 1991 ). 
89 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical Findings and Policy Implications 
This study emerged from the poor economic performance of the Sub-Saharan 
African countries in general and the CFA countries in particular. The situation is really 
disappointing when one compares the results of the efforts of the other developing 
countries to those of Sub-Saharan Africa. As characterized in Finance and Development1, 
A handful of developing economies are emerging as potential 
giants. In 1995, the 10 largest - Argentine, Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey -
accounted for 59 percent of the developing world's GDP and 
44 percent of its exports, and 11 percent of world GDP. By 
contrast, the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 
10.4 percent of the world's population but only 1.1 percent 
of world GDP. 
Our main concern has been the case of the CF A countries with an even worse 
economic performance when faced with an economic crisis (by the mid-1980s) following 
external shocks and inappropriate domestic policies. The subsequent lack of external 
competitiveness was given particular attention in this study. 
The analysis of the real effective exchange rate (external competitiveness indicator) 
points to different factors that influence the CFA zone's external 
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competitiveness. Of particular importance is the effect of a nominal devaluation on the real 
effective exchange rate. It was found that a nominal devaluation will have a real 
depreciation effect on the real effective exchange rate of the zone in the long run. This 
result leads to a policy proposition that the CFA zone authorities should use the exchange 
rate as a policy instrument when needed. This does not mean that each country should ( or 
can) resort to the exchange rate as a policy variable, as this is impossible given the 
arrangements of the zone. However, a misalignment of the exchange rate that threatens 
the entire zone needs to be given immediate attention by adjusting the currency to reflect 
its real value. This assumes, of course, that the other effects of a nominal devaluation are 
also taken into account . 
The sizable overvaluation (appreciation) of the CFA Franc (from the mid-l 980s to 
early 1990s) and its various consequences on the zone's economy, could have been 
avoided if corrective actions were taken earlier to address the problem by devaluing the 
currency. 
In practice, a successful devaluation must entail more than a simple change in the 
parity of the currency. This is because the .incipient gain in the external competitiveness 
following a nominal devaluation can be threatened by higher inflation brought about by the 
same nominal devaluation. As a consequence, to effectively guarantee (and protect) the 
competitiveness gain, the zone authorities need to accompany a nominal devaluation with 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to contain inflation. As such, devaluation will not 
be painless to society, and this explains its unpopularity to correct the zone's problem. A 
comprehensive analysis of a devaluation should be based on its long-run effects, and not 
( erroneously) on its effects in the short run. "[l]mplementation of rigorous fiscal, wage, 
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and monetary policies ... "2 , as part of a policy package to secure external competitiveness, 
is just the inevitable cost to incur in the short run in order to guarantee larger gains for the 
economy in the long run. 
Arguments based on the short-run costs to society, against nominal devaluation are 
thus without economic foundation. As far as external competitiveness is concerned, and 
based on our results, a CFA Franc devaluation will help the zone regain its external 
competitiveness. Without this, and in the face of a CFA overvaluation, the zone (and the 
Sub-Saharan Africa .in general) will be marginalised in today's challenging world 
environment and, therefore, continue to retain its ''unfortunate" title of the world's 
poorest region. Adoption of the proposed policy would increase the gains derived from 
the CF A membership, apart from the fiscal and monetary discipline conferred by the zone. 
Although the zone should use, when necessary, the exchange rate as a policy 
instrument, the problem, however, still exists at the individual country level, as the 
exchange rate policy cannot be tailored at any time to address the specific problems of a 
given country in the zone. The only solution to such a problem would be for each country 
to have· its own currency a.pd central bank. It is not advisable at this point to propose such 
a solution to any country until the costs and benefits of participating in the zone are 
evaluated. 
Another crucial point worth studying when considering a devaluation of a 
currency is export and import growth. The question was raised as to whether a real 
depreciation will bring about export growth, and reduce imports to the zone. The results 
indicate that exports from the zone will expand while imports w'ill contract following a 
devaluation of the CF A Franc. This finding lends strong support to the view that a 
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devaluation of the CFA Franc should be considered whenever necessary. It is important to 
note that the results only point to the fact that a reduction in export prices (in foreign 
currency) will be associated with more demand from the zone. Exports, however, may not 
increase as rapidly if the sector does not expand enough to satisfy the increased demand. 
Thus, one of the conditions necessary to reap all the benefits of a devaluation is factor 
mobility, especially from the nontradeable to the tradeable sector. 
In addition to factor mobility, the zone needs to expand it tradeable commodity 
base to offer a larger variety of goods to its export market. The limited number of 
exportables has been one of the constraints of the CFA countries to adjust to external 
shocks. Favorable internal conditions3 to attract foreign capital inflows can contribute to 
the fulfillment of that objective. Foreign capital inflows to the Sub-Saharan Africa 
(especially CFA countries) has been modest compared to other regions of developing 
countries (see Table 18). 
The CFA countries also need to find better ways to penetrate the world market in 
order to increase their market share. A shrinking ( or constant) export market share plays 
to the region's disadvantage. 
Finally, the trade policies of the CFA zone should be reconsidered to allow for 
more openness of the zone's economies to the rest of the world (in other words, the zone 
should adopt a more outward looking approach). As our results show, trade restrictions 
impinge on the international trade flows of the zone. The zone, thus, stands to gain more 
(in terms of favorable external balances, output growth, and lower inflation) by liberalizing 
its exchange and · trade regimes (see APPENDIX D). To the extent that the 
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Table 18: Foreign Capital Flows to Developing Countries 
(1990-1994) 
Region Percentage 
East Asia and the Pacific 52 
Latin America 29 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 
Middle East and North Africa 4 
South Asia 2 
Source: Adapted from Bergsman and Shen ( 1995) 
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bulk of the trade restrictions on the zone's international trade flows derives from the 
zone's own policies, it is possible to expand trade flows by removing (or reducing) those, 
self-imposed costs of trade barriers. As Yeats et al.·(1996) notes, 
Import restrictions frequently create a bias against exports 
that prevents local entrepreneurs from capitalizing on export 
opportunities. High tariffs and NTBs [Non-Trade Barriers] may 
significantly raise prices for production inputs and greatly 
diminish potential exporters' ability to compete in foreign markets . 
... sub-Saharan African trade barriers are far more restrictive 
than those of any other group. Tariffs in the countries of sub-
Saharan Africa average 26.8 percent - more than three times 
those of the fast-growing exporters, and more than four times 
the OECD average. OECD members reduced their tariffs by 
almost 40 percent in the recent Uruguay Round (to about 3.9 
percent), and many of the fast-growing exporters also made 
important concessions on trade barriers. In contrast, sub-
Saharan Africa's trade barriers were virtually un~hanged by 
the Uruguay Round. As a result, the current spread between 
sub-Saharan Africa's tariffs (and between its tariffs and other 
import charges combined) and those in the other countries 
has widened, threatening export competitiveness. 
Given this fact, much needs to be done by the CF A countries themselves if export 
growth is to be enhanced. In addition, a more global and export-friendly approach is to be . 
adopted by the CPA zone countries in order to improve their position in the new and 
emerging international market arena. And, "The proper response is certainly not despair. 
For the one thing that can be said about the emerging global economic order is that it is 
redolent with opportunities for nations able to find nimbleness and efficiency. Who dares 
wins. A more open, predictable world trading system is coming to being. World aggregate 
demand is set to grow significantly. It is a climacteric. Niches can be found in the global 
market-place by those who organize themselves aright." (West Africa, 17-23 April 1995, 
Who dares wins). 
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Our study also extends to include inflation. and real output effects of devaluation. 
As indicated before, one of the advantages generally associated with a pegged exchange 
rate regime is the low inflation it embeds. The monetary and fiscal discipline conferred by 
the CF A zone does confirm that view. Inflation has been very low in the member countries 
and is usually referred to as one of the reasons for opposing a devaluation of the CF A 
Franc. The low inflation secured through the pegging system, however, does not seem· 
worth the loss of real output. 
The lesson from the CF A experience during the period of the mid- l 980s to 1993 is 
that correcting real exchange rate misalignment through demand management alone can be 
too costly to an economy (with a pegged system) in terms of real output loss. Adjusting· 
the nominal exchange rate to reflect its real value is the effective way of addressing a lack 
of competitiveness problem, especially when the problem derives from external shocks. 
The inflation that results should not deter the policy makers, as it could be managed. 
Inflation following a devaluation can be contained through appropriate policies. 
With the main objective being economic growth, policies to bring it about should be 
favored over policies to simply reduce inflation. As our analyses led us to. conclude, 
devaluation, contrary to the view of its opponents, can restore economic growth (real 
output) of the CFA zone in the long run. Thus policies designed to affect real output 
should also take into account the exchange rate (to correct any misalignment). Again, this 
may be a difficult policy as the exchange rate alignment will require (to a certain degree) 
the agreement of all member countries. Exchange rate reevaluation not only will affect the 
member countries differently, but also given the state of each economy in the zone at the 
time of a devaluation, the latter and/or its magnitude may not suit all the member countries 
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individually. But as far as the zone is concerned, the exchange reevaluation policy to affect 
_output growth should be favored. 
The adoption of the fixed exchange rate regime should not constitute a handicap 
for reaping the benefits of exchange rate alignment. Although some deviations are 
unavoidable, major misalignments should be viewed as a serious problem, and therefore 
corrected. Of course, there is no denying that exchange rate misalignment is not the only 
distorting factor that affects real output growth. It is however by far the most important 
form of distortion that affects economic growth, as claimed by Agarwala (1983). This is 
no surprise as distortions of the exchange rate affect the prices of all other goods and their 
production. 
The positive output response to exchange rate alignment is confirmed in a number 
of studies. In the developing countries in general and the CF A countries in particular, the 
fear has been the importance of the intermediate goods of those countries in their imports. 
The empirical results in this study, however, lead to a conclusion that the CFA zone will 
gain in the long run in terms of real output (following a devaluation). This should reduce 
the uncertainty of the zone's policy makers and encourage them to consider a devaluation 
policy when the economic conditions of the zone requires it. Observation of the ( early) 
results (see APPENDICES E to I) of the 1994 devaluation of the CFA Franc indicates 
that devaluation can indeed improve the economic performance of the CF A zone. 
A real depreciation of the CFA Franc occurred in 1994 following the nominal 
devaluation (APPENDIX E). Accompanying contractionary monetary and fiscal policies in 
the zone reduced the incipient and sharp inflation that resulted in the year of the 
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devaluation (APPENDIX F), and helped maintain (after a slight appreciation) the external 
competitiveness gain. 
Exports responded favorably to the real depreciation although imports also 
increased in the wake of the devaluation (APPENDICES G and H, respectively). Exports 
and imports are expected to adjust more in the long run. Real GDP growth also increased 
in the member countries (APPENDIX I). Given that the real depreciation of the CFA is 
protected, real GDP will continue to grow in the years to come. 
Conclusion 
The adoption of fixed exchange rat~ system by the CF A zone appeared to have 
paid off (in terms of economic growth and lower inflation) until the mid-1980s. The 
reversal of the economic performance of the zone since then, and the attempts to address 
the problem through internal adjustment alone reflected the zone's rigidity regarding the 
use of the exchange rate as a policy variable. The deterioration of the terms of trade, and 
severe exchange rate overvaluation that initiated the crisis, imply that internal adjustment 
( demand management alone) would be insufficient and must be coupled with exchange 
rate reevaluation policy. 
The fixed exchange rate regime should not prevent the CFA zone from using the 
exchange rate as a policy instrument. The fear of that policy regarding its uncertain long-
run effects on the external competitiveness, exports, imports, and real output, and 
especially its obvious effect on domestic inflation, deters policy makers. However, this 
should not constitute a major hindrance from using the exchange rate policy, as confirmed 
by this study. Moreover, the changing pattern of exchange rate arrangements (shifts from 
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pegged to more flexible regime; see APPENDIX J) is another- indication that exchange 
rate policy is vital for good economic performance. 
Because nominal devaluation is able to depreciate the CF A Franc in real terms, and 
thereby improve the zone's external competitiveness (and favorably affect the other 
economic variables), policies in the zone need to be flexible and respond to internal as well 
as external shocks (including nominal devaluation of the CFA Franc whenever deemed 
necessary). Adoption· of such policy would,· in addition to the stability and credibility 
conferred by th~ fixed exchange rate regime, allow the zone to derive some of the benefits 
of a flexible exchange rate regime. The result would be greater benefits for the zone as a 
whole and each member country. 
1. Finance & Development, March 1997, pp. 48 
2. IMF Survey, February 1994. pp.35 
3. Some of these conditions include stable political and economic environments, open markets, minimal 
regulation, good infrastructure.facilities, low production costs. Most Sub-Saharan African countries, by 
contrast, are characterized by frequent civil strike, macroeconomic instability, slow economic growth and 
small domestic market, inward orientation and burdensome regulations, poor infrastructure facilities 
(Bhattacharya et al., 1997). 
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APPENDIX A : THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CFA FRANC 
ZONE 
The CFA (Communote Financiere Africaine) zone compnses 14 countries 
(excluding the Comoros Islands) subdivided in two regions (west and central) each with 
its own central bank. All the zone member countries have a common currency (CFA 
Franc) pegged to the French Franc (FF) since 1948, with a parity rate of 50 CFA Francs 
for 1 FF until January 1994 when a large devaluation took place (100 CFA for 1 FF). 
France guarantees unlimited convertibility of the CF A Franc into French Francs through 
an operations account at the French Treasury. The member central banks are required to 
keep 65 percent of their exchange reserves in French Francs at the central bank of France, 
"Banque de France". 
The CF A zone is characterized by a fixed exchange rate, monetary integration, and 
full currency convertibility, with the main objective of coordinating monetary and fiscal 
policies of the member countries, and therefore, foster and maintain their economic and 
financial stability. 
To achieve those goals, the zone is governed by four principles (see Allechi and 
Niamkey, 1994): 
I . Fixed parity between the CF A Franc and the French Franc. Such parity can be 
changed only by unanimous agreement between member countries and France. 
2. Full convertibility of the CFA Franc into French Francs, guaranteed through 
the special operations account opened at the French Treasury, not at the 
Banque de France, the French central bank. 
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3. Free transferability without limit within member countries and between these 
countries and France. 
4. Pooled reserves system under which the Franc zone uses a common foreign 
exchange policy against the rest of the world. 
One of the drawbacks of the zone is that the member countries cannot, 
individually, adopt an exchange rate policy tailored at addressing their specific economic 
and financial problems. 
The fifteen member countries (including the Comoros Islands) are as follows: 
- West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Coted' Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, and Togo, are grouped in the West African Monetary Union (Union 
Monetaire Quest Africaine, UMOA). The Banque Centrale des Etats de 
l'Afrique de l' Ouest, BCEAO is their common central bank. 
- Central Africa: Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic (CAR), 
Chad, and Equatorial Guinea, are served by the Banque des Etats de 
l' Afrique Centrale, their common central bank. 
- The Comoros Islands, with its own c.entral bank. 
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APPENDIX B: NOMINAL AND REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES, AND 










APPENDIX B.1: COTE D' IVOIRE: Nominal and Real Effective 
Exchange rates, and Terms of Trade 
Year 
APPENDIX B.2: BENIN: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange 
Rates, and Terms of Trade 
Year 
NEER is nominal effective exchange rate 
REER is real effective exchange rate 







An increase in NEER or REER is a depreciation. An increase in TOT is an 
appreciation 
Source: The NEER and REER are computed by the author. The TOT are from the 
International Financial Statistics 
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Note: 
APPENDIX B.3: TOGO: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange 
Rates, and Terms of Trade 
Year 
APPENDIX B.4: BURKINA FASO: Nominal and Real Effective 
Echange Rates, and Trems of Trade 
Year 
NEER is nominal effective exchange rate 
REER is real effective exchange rate 







An increase in NEER or REER is a depreciation. An increase in TOT is an 
appreciation 
Source: The NEER and REER are computed by the author. The TOT are from the 
International Financial Statistics 
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Note: 
APPENDIX 8.5: NIGER: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange 
Rates, and Terms of Trade 
Year 
APPENDIX 8.6: SENEGAL: Nominal and Real -Effective Exchange 
Rates, and Terms of Trade 
Year 
NEER is nominal effective exchange rate 
REER is real effective exchange rate 







An increase in NEER or REER is a depreciation. An increase in TOT is an 
appreciation 
Source: The NEER and REER are computed by the author. The TOT are from the 













APPENDIX B. 7: GABON: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange 






APPENDIX B.8: CAMEROON: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange 
Rates,and Terms of Trade 
Year 
NEER is nominal effective exchange rate 
REER is real effective exchange rate 




An increase in NEER or REER is a depreciation. An increase in TOT is an 
appreciation 
Source: The NEER and REER are computed by the author. The TOT are from the 









APPENDIX 8.9: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: Nominal and Real 
Effective Exchange Rates, and Terms of Trade 
APPENDIX 8.10: CONGO: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange 
















NEER is nominal effective exchange rate 
REER is real effective exchange rate 




An increase in NEER or REER is a depreciation. An increase in TOT is an 
appreciation 
Source: The NEER and REER are computed by the author. The TOT are from the 
International Financial Statistics 
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APPENDIX C : THE COMPLETE MODEL 
1. Real Effective Exchange Rate 
LREER = O'o + 0'1LREERI + cr2LTOT + 0'3CAPF + 0'4LINV 
2. Exports 
+ O'sLTRES + 0'6LMONS + cr7LGCONS + crsNOMDEV 
+ 0'9NOMDE 1 + e 
LEXP = <>o + 01LREER + c>iLGDPF + <>JLTRES + c>4LEXPI + u 
3. Imports 
LIMP = 'Yo + "(1LREER + "(2LGDP +"f3LTRES + "(4LlMPl + m 
4. Inflation 
INFLD ='Po+ 'l'1LRMONSI + 'l'2LGDG + 'l'3INTD + 'l'4NOMDEV 
+ 'l'sNOMDEl + \J'61NFLF + 'I'1T + Tl 
5. Real Output 
LGDP = 'f/o + 'f/1LTOT + 'f/2LRMONS + 'f/3LGCONS + 'f/~REER 
+ 'f/sLREER 1 + e 
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APPENDIX D: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE DEGREE OF OPENNESS AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
(A I t h 1986 91) verage annua percen c an ~e, -
Number of Growth Inflation 
countries (% a Year) 
Average degree of openness 1 
Less than 25 28 3.5 344.6 
25 to 40 23 5.2 50.7 
More than 40 23 5.7 5.0 
Openness by exports2 
Less than 25 38 3.5 247.6 
25 to 40 16 5.3 14.4 
More than 40 20 6.2 3.1 
1. Defined as the average of exports and imports as percent of GDP 
2. Defined as exports as percent of GDP 
Source: World Economic Outlook, October 1992 
Outward-looking strategy has been identified as a policy that can open an economy 
to the rest of the world. A country that is open to the rest of the world faces international 
competition which can lead to efficient resource allocation and lower domestic inflation. In 
addition, and in the case of developing countries (CFA countries in particular), a higher 
degree of openness will make available to domestic producers a wider range of 
intermediate goods to choose from. Thus, a high degree of openness must be positively 














APPENDIX E: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE 1994 CFA DEVALUATION (1990::100) 






~ Cote d' lvoire 
-,IE-- Gabon 
Note: An increase is a depreciation 
Source: International Financial Statistics, September 1997. 
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APPENDIXF: INFLATIONBEFOREANDAFTERTHE·1994CFA 
DEVALUATION {CPI, annual percentchange) 
Year 





~ Cote d' lvoire 
~Gabon 
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APPENDIX H: IMPORTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1994 CFA 
DEVALUATION (1990::100) . 


















APPENDIX I: REAL GDP GROWTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1994 






--*"-Cote d' lvoire 
--l!E-Gabon 
Source: World Economic Outlook, October 1997 
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APPENDIX J: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: OFFICIALLY REPORTED EXCHANGE 
RATE ARRANGEMENTS1 (I t f T t 1) n percen o oa 
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
Pegged 86 75 67 57 45 
U.S. dollar 42 32 25 19 15 
French Franc 13 12 11 11 11 
Other 7 4 4 3 4 
SDR 12 13 8 5 2 
Composite 12 14 18 20 14 
Limited Flexibility 3 10 5 4 3 
Single 3 10 5 4 3 
Cooperative - - - - -
More Flexible 11 15 28 39 52 
Set to indicators 6 3 4 4 2 
Managed floating 4 9 13 16 21 
Independently floating 1 4 11 19 29 
Number of countries 100 113 119 123 123 











1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
--II'- Limited Flexibility 
_._ rvbre Flexible 
Year 
I. Based on end-of-year classification. 
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